THE IRAQ DEBACLE: THE RISE AND FALL OF
PROCUREMENT-AIDED UNILATERALISM AS A PARADIGM
OF FOREIGN WAR
BY CHARLES TIEFER*
1.

INTRODUCTION

What underlies the debacle of the American mishandling in
2003-2007 of the Iraq insurgency, as that grew and spawned civil
Adequate discussion has already gone to the
strife?'
administration's failed political paradigm initially going into Iraq:
the neoconservative unilateralism, along with a bungled military
approach to early occupation, that proceeded without United
Nations support; this elicited shunning internationally and
particularly from neighboring countries, and exacerbated
antagonism within Iraq. 2 What deserves deeper analysis is the
administration's supporting or "how-to" paradigm as the effort
continued: the rise and fall of its paradigm as to the policy and law
. Professor, University of Baltimore Law School; B.A., summa cum laude,
Columbia College 1974; J.D., magna cum laude, Harvard Law School 1977.
1 See, e.g., DINA RASOR & ROBERT BAUMAN, BETRAYING OUR TROOPS: THE
DESTRUCTIVE RESULTS OF PRIVATIZING WAR (2007) (describing how the use of private

contractors in the Iraq War had destructive results on American troops, strategic
interests, and image abroad); THOMAS E. RICKS, FIASCO: THE AMERICAN MILITARY
ADVENTURE IN IRAQ (2006) (critiquing American failure to anticipate, recognize,
and effectively address the local insurgency in Iraq); MICHAEL R. GORDON &
BERNARD E. TRAINOR, COBRA II: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE INVASION AND OCCUPATION

OF IRAQ (2006) (maintaining that false assumptions, faulty intelligence, willful
ignorance, personal politics, and a lack of foresight led to a disastrous outcome in
Iraq); LARRY DIAMOND, SQUANDERED VICTORY: THE AMERICAN OCCUPATION AND THE
BUNGLED EFFORT TO BRING DEMOCRACY TO IRAQ (2006) (providing an insider's

examination of what went wrong with Iraq after the initial invasion); GEORGE
PACKER, THE ASSASSINS' GATE: AMERICA IN IRAQ (2005) (illustrating the bureaucratic

warfare within the Bush administration that led to chaos in Iraq).
2 See, e.g., Winston P. Nagan & Craig Hammer, The New Bush National Security
Doctrine and the Rule of Law, 22 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 375 (2004) (discussing U.S.
unilateralism under the Bush Doctrine and its tension with the United Nations
and other diplomatic alliances under international law); Andreas Paulus, The War
Against Iraq and the Future of InternationalLaw: Hegemony Or Pluralism?,25 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 691 (2004) (arguing for recognizing the significance of international law in
spite of the dominant power of U.S. hegemony).
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of procurement and funding that sought to aid in, but failed at,
sustaining, with capped American troop levels, that unilateral
commitment in Iraq.
Press coverage, 3 and the belatedly revived congressional
oversight in 2006-20074 revealed how waste, abuse, and failure of
American contracting in Iraq swelled overall costs and
undermined effectiveness. However, such oversight still requires
analysis to reveal the rise and fall of an elaborate, if largely
unspoken, legal and policy paradigm for supporting a unilateral
war in the absence of international and local support. The
paradigm in 2003-2007 of unilateral war aided by procurement
and by unaccountable funding not only helps explain the longterm fate of the unpropitious effort in Iraq, but also has serious
implications for future wars.
So, after an introductory section, this Article analyzes, in three
parts, the rise and fall of the administration's procurement-aided
unilateralism as its "how-to" paradigm for supporting the Iraq war
in 2003-2007.
1.1. The Various Aspects of the Failure
First, an administration led by Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld (through 2006) and Vice President Cheney followed
what it called "military transformation" 5 in a procurement-fueled
3 See, e.g., T. CHRISTIAN MILLER, BLOOD MONEY: WASTED BILLIONS, LOST LIvES,
AND CORPORATE GREED IN IRAQ (2006) (exposing the incompetence and corruption
of the U.S.-led reconstruction effort in Iraq); DAVID L. PHILLIPS, LOSING IRAQ: INSIDE
THE POSTWAR RECONSTRUCTION FIASCO (2005) (documenting U.S. government

leaders' willful disregard of the opinions of Iraqi and international officials, which
hindered U.S. efforts to win the trust of the Iraqi public); Scott Shane & Ron
Nixon, In Washington, ContractorsTake on Biggest Role Ever, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2007,
at Al (reporting the sharply increasing role of contractors, and the fraud and
waste that often follows).
4 SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS Dry., HOUSE COMM. ON GOVT REFORM-MINORITY
DOLLARS, NOT SENSE: GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING UNDER THE BUSH

STAFF,

ADMINISTRATION (June 2006) [hereinafter DOLLARS, NOT SENSE]; see, e.g., Megan
Scully, CBO Says War Costs May Top $1 Trillion Over 10 Years..., CONGRESSDAILY,
July 31, 2007, http://nationaljournal.com/pubs/congressdaily/
[hereinafter
Scully, War Costs] (reporting the projected cost of $1 trillion for the Iraq war,
presented to the House Budget Committee); Megan Scully, Update on Iraq
Contracting Problems Dismays Lawmakers, CONGRESSDAILY, May 10, 2007,
http://nationaljoumal.com/pubs/congressdaily/
[hereinafter Scully, Iraq]
(describing the contracting problems in Iraq that have led to the waste of billions
of reconstruction dollars).
5 Then-Governor Bush had put it in his speech at the Citadel, in South
Carolina, in 1998. GORDON & TRAINOR, supra note 1, at 497. About military

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol29/iss1/1

2007]

THE IRAQ DEBACLE

"Military
risky combination with diplomatic unilateralism.
transformation" 6 relies upon America's particular strength as the
one high-tech superpower of the post-Cold War world-its
capacity to shatter virtually any regular opposing forces by its
procured sophisticated weaponry, from stealth craft and
information technology-based combat gear to missile defense7 -a
capacity that does not depend upon the legitimation of multilateral
institutions like the United Nations and NATO. It transpired that
such "military transformation" procurement, for all its
effectiveness in shattering the regular organized forces of Saddam
Hussein, crowded out what the United States really would need
for a unilateralist effort in Iraq-"boots on the ground," i.e., the
quantity of American and supporting ground forces to hold down
irregular opponents.8 The United States' approach of unilateralism
shaped by military transformation 9 rendered the Iraq effort
especially vulnerable to the withholding of hoped-for large
transformation itself, see Christopher B. Puckett, Comment, In this Era of "Smart
Weapons," Is a State Under an International Legal Obligation to Use Precision-Guided
Technology in Armed Conflict?, 18 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 645, 652 n.46 (2004) and
accompanying text (giving examples of new combat methods that allow for
greater precision and flexibility); Peter J. Boyer, A Different War: Is the Army
Becoming Irrelevant?, NEW YORKER, July 1, 2002, at 54 (delineating then-Army Chief
of Staff General Eric K. Shinseki's plans to drastically reform the military); James
Kitfield, About-Face: Stymied in Its Efforts to "Transform" the Military Before 9/11, the
Rumsfeld Team is Using the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan to Push a Radical Makeover of
U.S. Forces, NAT. J., Jan. 31, 2004, at 308 (describing then-Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld's efforts to reform U.S. forces after the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan).
THE
FINDING
THE TARGET:
W. KAGAN,
6 See generally FREDERICK
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MILITARY POLICY (2006) (giving a history of U.S.
military transformation from Vietnam to Iraq).
7 See generally Frederick W. Kagan, The Art of War, NEW CRITERION, Nov.
2003, at 4 (giving examples to support the proposition that the American military
is in many respects at the height of its power). For background on missile
defense, see Emily K. Penney, Is That Legal? The United States' Unilateral
Withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 1287 (2002)
(detailing the history and development of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the
legal implications of the unilateral withdrawal of the United States).
8 James Kitfield, The General's Case, NAT. J., May 6, 2006, at 20 (noting the
opinions of some in the army and DOD that the utilization of a smaller invasion
force put too few troops on the ground during the initial invasion of Iraq).
9 See, e.g., Sandra I. Erwin, Army: War Duties Should Warrant a Bigger Budget,
NAT'L DEFENSE, Dec. 2005, at 16 (noting the complaints of the army acquisition
chief about DOD's "top 20" research, development, and acquisition programs,
only three of which were for new army hardware (and two for helicopter
upgrades), when the other three-quarters were for the other services, even though
the army's units "are the heavy lifters").
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peacekeeping forces from Turkey, India, and Egypt, as well as to
the lack of help from Iraq's influential neighbors such as Saudi
Arabia, Syria, and Iran.10
This was the United States's approach, coupled with a radical
"acquisition reform"11 approach, especially as to outsourcing, 12 for
procurement of both military support (logistics, security, and
training) and reconstruction. In practice, the administration used
acquisition reform and outsourcing to select and indulge
contractors who would serve loyally; the administration did not
necessarily reach out to competitive contractors nor to those who
would help expand the Iraq commitment's base of practical
support to allied and neighboring countries and locally within Iraq
itself.' 3 This administration approach minimized the roles of the
shrinking acquisition workforce, of competition, and of scrutiny of
performance.' 4 Among the ensuing scandals from "acquisition

10 See JAMES A. BAKER III ET AL., THE IRAQ STUDY GROUP REPORT 24 (2006)
[hereinafter IRAQ STUDY GROUP REPORT] ("Iraq's neighbors are doing little to help
it, and some are undercutting its stability.").
11 Charles Tiefer & Ron Stroman, CongressionalIntent and Commercial Products,
PROCUREMENT LAW., Spring 1997, at 22 (analyzing acquisition reform legislation).
12 For the background of outsourcing and privatizing, see Keith Harley, The
Economics of Military Outsourcing, 11 PUB. PROCUREMENT L. REV. 287, 290 (2002);
Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367 (2003)
(giving contemporary examples of privatization and its implications on current
constitutional doctrine); Symposium, Public Values in an Era of Privatization, 116
HARV. L. REV. 1211 (2003) (analyzing the juxtaposition of privatization and
government).
13 About the owner of the private security contractor Blackwater, Erik Prince:
"Prince's political connections may well have helped his company win these
crucial contracts from the Bush administration .... And Blackwater has hired ...
Joseph Schmitz, a former Pentagon inspector general whose duties included
investigating contractual agreements with firms like Blackwater." Brian Bennett,
Outsourcing the War, TIME, March 26, 2007, at 38. For a book-length account, see
JEREMY

SCAHILL,

BLACKWATER:

THE

RISE

OF THE

WORLD'S

MOST

POWERFUL

MERCENARY ARMY (2007).
14 See, e.g., Shelley Roberts Econom, Confronting the Looming Crisis in the
Federal Acquisition Workforce, 35 PUB. CONT. L.J. 174 (2006) (exploring "legal, policy,
and contracting issues raised by the Government's increased reliance on
contractors to perform its work and the simultaneous abandonment of contract
administration and oversight"); Dawn Kopecki, When Outsourcing Turns
Outrageous; Contractors May Be Saving the Army Money, But Fraud Changes the
Equation, Bus. WK., July 31, 2006, at 54 (reporting of the proliferation of contractor
fraud in Iraq, "[t]he volume of sole-source and other noncompetitive contracts
awarded by the military has soared 54% since 2000, from $65 billion to $100
billion").
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reform" and outsourcing 15 was the implication of contractors in
"Abu Ghraib" tactics which disdained international law 16 such as
the Geneva Convention. 17 In turn, such dependence upon large
administration-loyal American contractors rather than local Iraqi
contractors and employees further angered both a Sunni
insurgency stung by its loss of influence and work, and,
particularly in 2006-2007, Shiite militias swollen with out-of-work
ex-soldiers ready to resort to civil strife.18
Second, the administration brought a unilateralist approach to
procurement-related aspects 19 of Iraqi civil affairs, especially the
15 See, e.g., Martha Minow, Outsourcing Power: How PrivatizingMilitary Efforts
Challenges Accountability, Professionalism,and Democracy, 46 B.C. L. REV. 989 (2005)
(explaining that the lack of transparency in the use of private contractors has often
led to high-profile scandals); Steven L. Schooner, Contractor Atrocities at Abu
Ghraib: Compromised Accountability in a Streamlined, Outsourced Government, 16
STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 549 (2005) (describing the allegations that contractor
personnel were involved in the Abu Ghraib abuses, and raising concerns with
regard to the outsourcing trend in the military).
16 See Mark W. Bina, Comment, Private Military Contractor Liability and
Accountability After Abu Ghraib, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1237 (2005) (discussing
current federal laws, international laws, and cases relevant to private military
contractors using the Abu Ghraib scandal as an example); Charles H. Brower II,
The Lives of Animals, The Lives of Prisoners,and the Revelations of Abu Ghraib, 37
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1353 (2004) (discussing the "function[s] and importance of
legal personality" and demonstrating how Abu Ghraib prisoners were deprived
of the protections of legal personality); Laura A. Dickinson, Government for Hire:
Privatizing ForeignAffairs and the Problem of Accountability Under InternationalLaw,
47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 135 (2005) (exploring alternative theories of international
law to address accountability problems of privatization). See generally Mark Osiel,
The Banality of Good: Aligning Incentives Against Mass Atrocity, 105 COLUM. L. REV.
1751 (2005) (discussing how to deter atrocities, including those committed by
privatized military companies).
17 See Marcy Strauss, The Lessons of Abu Ghraib, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1269 (2005)
(referring to the Bush administration's policy of disregard of international legal
norms, including the Geneva Conventions). But see Tara McKelvey, Torture, Inc.:
Will Two American CorporationsBe Held Liable for the Abuse That Took Place at Abu
Ghraib?, LEGAL AFF., Sept-Oct. 2005, at 13 (describing how one lawyer is using the
Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000), and the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (2000), to hold American corporations
liable for Abu Ghraib abuse).
18 The Armed Forces Journal published a persuasive criticism: "Poverty,
coupled with a breakdown of civil society, forces the population to develop
security along ethnic and sectarian lines," as occurred when "[e]conomically, the
U.S. failed to provide meaningful employment or opportunities for investment to
individual Iraqis," while "the U.S. was spending billions of dollars on logistical
contracting." Richard May, Opportunity Missed; Logistics Support Contracts with
Locals Would Help Stabilize Iraq, ARMED FORCES J., June 2007, at 36.
19 The reconstruction effort was touted as "the most ambitious [such]
program . . . since the Marshall Plan in 1947." Robert Nichols, Introductory
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critical aspect of reconstruction.
From the outset, the
administration scorned as "nation-building" 20 the past multilateral
approach of the State Department 21 though reconstruction that had
succeeded in the Bosnia occupation 22 and could obtain multilateral
support again. 23 Rather, the White House shifted power to a
Defense Department ("DOD") necessarily over-dependent upon
24
contractor-paid exiles and the United States' contractor industry.

Remarks: Protagonistor Pawn? The PrivateContractor in Foreign Affairs, 99 AM. SOC'Y
INT'L L. PRoc. 373, 374 (2005).
20 As for the relation of nation-building to what has occurred in the Iraq
occupation, see, for example, Melissa Patterson, Note, Who's Got the Title? or, The
Remnants of Debellatio in Post-Invasion Iraq, 47 HARV. INT'L L.J. 467 (2006) (arguing
that a modem doctrine of nation-building is more applicable to post-invasion Iraq
than the currently employed occupation law); Stephen Townley, Perspectives on
Nation-Building, 30 YALE. J. INT'L L. 357 (2005) (discussing the various facets of
nation-building with regard to the situation of Iraq under foreign occupation).
21 See generally Ralph Wilde, From Bosnia to Kosovo and East Timor: The
Changing Role of the United Nations in the Administration of Territory, 6 ILSA J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 467 (2000) (discussing the occupation of Bosnia after the Dayton
Agreement).
22 Compare Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Iraq and the Future of United States Foreign
Policy: Failures of Legitimacy, 31 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 149 (2004) (criticizing
the administration), with Walden Bello, The Rise of the Relief-and-Reconstruction
Complex, J. INT'L AFF., Spring-Summer 2006, at 281 (supporting the
administration).
23 See, e.g., Grant T. Harris, The Era of Multilateral Occupation, 24 BERKELEY J.
INT'L L. 1 (2006) (presenting a case for multilateral occupation using the
occupation of Iraq as an example); Stephanie Bellier, Unilateral and Multilateral
Preventive Self-Defense, 58 ME. L. REV. 508, 531 (2006) (noting the U.N. Security
Council's "monopoly on preventative armed force"); Ash U. Bali, Justice Under
Occupation: Rule of Law and the Ethics of Nation-Building in Iraq, 30 YALE J. INT'L L.
431 (2005) (inquiring into the relationship between rule of law and justice on the
one hand, and regime chance, occupation, and reconstruction on the other); John
Dermody, Note, Beyond Good Intentions: Can Hybrid Tribunals Work After Unilateral
Intervention? 30 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 77 (2006) (discussing how the
unique challenges of unilateral intervention impact the potential for hybrid
transitional justice tribunals).
24 For general discussions of the development of a contractor role in
privatized military support, see PETER W. SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE
OF THE PRIVATIZED MILITARY INDUSTRY (2003) (discussing the role of private military
support firms); Virginia Newell & Benedict Sheehy, Corporate Militariesand States:
Actors, Interactions, and Reactions, 41 TEX. INTL L.J. 67 (2006) (exploring the
interaction between private military firms and traditional state entities); Kristen
Fricchione, Note, Casualties in Evolving Warfare: Impact of Private Military Firms'
Proliferationon the InternationalCommunity, 23 WIS. INT'L L.J. 731 (2005) (discussing
the legal and jurisdictional ramifications of the increased reliance on private
forces); Ellen L. Frye, Note, Private Military Firms in the New World Order: How
Redefining "Mercenary" Can Tame the "Dogs of War," 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2607
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President Bush famously jibed, when the press asked him about
squaring-with international law-his bar against French or
German contract bids, "International law? I better call my lawyer.
He didn't bring that up to me." 25 The administration's belated and
grudging efforts at multilateralizing the Iraq occupation 26 failed to
spread the burdens much, even as to reconstruction. 27
Third, the administration's approach of intense evasion of
accountability disabled "power of the purse" 28 checks on
misdirected procurement and other spending. 29 This approach
(2005) (proposing a more exact definition of "mercenary" as a means of
controlling unwanted non-military behavior).
25 Evan Thomas & John Barry, 'I Better Call My Lawyer,' Are 'Munchkins' to
Blamefor a Badly Timed Iraq Memo?, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 22, 2003, at 40.
26 See Adam Roberts, Transformative Military Occupation: Applying the Laws of
War and Human Rights, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 580, 615-19 (2006) (highlighting U.S.
difficulty in developing laws for an occupied Iraq); Volinka Reina, Note, Iraq's
Delictual and Contractual Liabilities: Would Politics or International Law Provide for
Better Resolution of Successor State Responsibility?, 22 BERKELEY J.IN'Lt L. 583 (2004)
(illustrating the state of laws regarding successor states and sovereign immunity,
and predicting future claims in tort and contract arising out of the Iraq
succession).
27 See Nils Gilman, From Bosnia to Baghdad: The Tension Between Unilateralism
and Transformation, 3 THE FORUM issue 1, art. 3 (2005), available at
http://www.bepress.com/forum/vol3/issl/art3/
(explaining the problem of
American reliance on foreign forces for post-conflict responsibilities). In August
2006, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction was still calling for
efforts at "multilateralizing reconstruction." Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons Learned in
Contracting and Procurement: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and
Governmental Affairs, 109th Cong. 48 (2006) (statement of Stuart W. Bowen, Jr.,
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction).
28 See Richard D. Rosen, Funding "Non-Traditional" Military Operations: The
Alluring Myth of a PresidentialPower of the Purse, 155 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1998) (rebutting
the assertion that there is presidential spending power absent congressional
approval on matters deemed necessary for national security); Louis Fisher, How
Tightly Can Congress Draw the Purse Strings?, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 758 (1989)
(illustrating the impact of the President's ability to draw money from sources
outside the United States treasury); Michael J. Glennon, Strengthening the War
Powers Resolution: The Case for Purse-StringsRestrictions, 60 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1975)
(arguing that Congress should have more power to regulate presidential behavior
and proposing changes to the War Powers Resolution for such a result); Raoul
Berger, War-Making by the President, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 29, 78-79 (1972) (discussing
the possibility of returning, through a statutory framework, to the originally
intended balance of power between the executive and legislative branches).
29 See Philip J. Candreva & L. R. Jones, Congressional Control over Defense and
Delegation of Authority in the Case of the Defense Emergency Response Fund, 32 ARMED
FORCES & SOC., Oct. 2005, at 105 (illustrating how supplemental appropriations for
the War on Terror have influenced the civilian-military relationship); Tom
Campbell, Responsibility and War: Constitutional Separation of Powers Concerns, 57

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

U. Pa. J. In t'l L.

[Vol. 29:1

abused annual "emergency" supplemental appropriations 30 to
fund military spending without accountability.
In a telling
3
episode, international authorities criticized ' the United States for
inadequate accountability for Iraqi funds ("Development Fund for
Iraq," or "DFI").32
For seeking an understanding of the paradigm of procurementaided unilateralism, there are diverse invaluable sources: the
extensive journalistic coverage, the late 2006 report of the
bipartisan Iraq Study Group, and the renewal of congressional
oversight in 2007. 33 Two background elements brought the Author
into this: interests in implementation of war powers, dating to the
Author's serving as General Counsel of the House 34 in the

STAN. L. REV. 779 (2004) (positing that congressional power over appropriations

does not give the legislative branch sufficient oversight over war policy).
30 See David Baumann, War, Off the Books, NAT'L J.,
April 22, 2006, at 40
(explaining the dissent against funding the Iraq war largely through "emergency"
spending bills).
31 See Joy Gordon, Accountability and Global Governance:The Case of Iraq, ETHICS
& INT'L AFF. J., April 24, 2006, at 79 (providing three Iraq-based case studies of
what Gordon labels failures of international entities to hold governments
accountable for their foreign operations).
32 Pursuant to United Nations sanction resolutions, the receipts for selling
Iraqi oil went into the DFI, which came under the control of American authorities
in 2003-2004. See Owen Bonheimer, The Duty to Prevent Waste of Iraqi Assets
During Reconstruction: Taming Temptation Through ICI Jurisdiction, 34 PUB. CONT.
L.J. 673 (2005) (arguing that the International Court of Justice is the best choice for
enforcing the duty to prevent waste); Mahmoud Hmoud, The Use of Force Against
Iraq: Occupation and Security Council Resolution 1483, 36 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 435
(2004) (explaining broadly and chronologically the role of the U.N. Security
Council in the U.S. invasion of Iraq); Carl B. Kress, The United States Government
and Post-Conflict Economic Reconstruction,11 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 75 (2004)
(giving a framework of the presence and interaction of American governmental
agencies regarding reconstruction responsibilities). For the mishandling of DFI
funds, see MILLER, supra note 3, at 187-201.
33 See IRAQ STUDY GROUP REPORT, supra note 10 (assessing potential strategies
for U.S. action in Iraq, and suggesting increased international cooperation and
strengthened Iraqi self-governance); DOLLARS, NOT SENSE, supra note 4
(documenting what the authors define as wasteful and corrupt contracting for
post-war Iraq).
34 As Solicitor and Deputy General Counsel of the House of Representatives,
the Author filed the anicus brief for the House Leadership Group. Brief for the
House Leadership Group as Amici Curiae, Am. Foreign Serv. Ass'n v. Garfinkel,
490 U.S. 153 (1989) (No. 87-2127). The brief addressed the constitutionality of the
appropriation rider in that case, while also arguing the mootness issue, which the
Court accepted. The issues were nicely treated in Michael J. Glennon, Publish and
Perish: Congress's Effort to Snip Snepp (Before and AFSA), 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 163
(1989).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol29/iss1/1

2007]

THE IRAQ DEBACLE

investigation of Iran-Contra 35 and analysis of the Persian Gulf
War, 36 1990s conflicts 37 up to a 2006 analysis of appropriation riders
for winding down the Iraq war, 38 and, a specialty in procurement
law, expressed in books and in commentary in the broadcast and
print press. 39
The Conclusion seeks to go beyond simply resolving not to "do
Iraq again," i.e., to repeat how the United States went in. Recalling
the vital justification for some interventions, the Conclusion looks
to legislative reforms, particularly in procurement, for successfully
aiding a valid military intervention potentially faced with irregular
opposition. The United States should employ its procurement law,
by facilitating the cancellation of unneeded high-tech weaponry,
over what it takes to encourage and support a combination of U.S.
and foreign peacekeeping forces. This includes encouraging and
supporting a more flexible, efficient, and diverse multinational
reconstruction capacity.
35 As Special Deputy Chief Counsel on the House Iran-Contra Committee,
the Author co-authored the chapter in the committee report on the Boland
Amendments. S. REP. No. 100-216 & H. REP. No. 100433, at 395 (1987). For a
previous discussion drawing on that service, see George W. Van Cleve & Charles
Tiefer, Navigating the Shoals of "Use" Immunity and Secret InternationalEnterprises in
Major CongressionalInvestigations: Lessons of the Iran-ContraAffair, 55 Mo. L. REV. 43
(1990).
36 See CHARLES TIEFER, THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN PRESIDENCY 119-36 (1994) (stating
that the Persian Gulf War marked a climax of the push-and-pull dynamic between
Congress and the Presidency during wartime).
37 See Charles Tiefer, CongressionalOversight of the Clinton Administration and
Congressional Procedure, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 199 (1998) (examining congressional
oversight over agencies since the passage of the Administrative Procedure Act).
This oversight includes Bosnia, Charles Tiefer, War Decisions in the Late 1990s by
Partial Congressional Declaration, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1 (1999) (harmonizing the
formalistic distaste toward "partial" declarations and the practical effect of such
acts), and Kosovo, Charles Tiefer, Recent Books on International Law, 96 AM J. INT'L
L. 489 (2002) (reviewing MICHAEL J. GLENNON, LIMITS OF LAW, PREROGATIVES OF
POWER: INTERVENTIONISM AFTER KoSovo (2001)); Charles Tiefer, Adjusting
Sovereignty: Contemporary Congressional-Executive Controversies About International
Organizations,35 TEX. INT'L L. J. 239 (2000) (discussing how the Kosovo and Serbia
bombing campaign fits other aspects of congressional-executive controversies).
38 See Charles Tiefer, Can Appropriation Riders Speed Our Exit From Iraq?, 42
STAN. J.INT'L L. 291 (2006) (expressing the potential impact of so-called "riders" on
the current war strategy).
39 See CHARLES TIEFER & WILLIAM A. SHOOK, GOVERNMENT CONTRACT LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 2004 & Supp. 2006) (providing a broad case study of
court findings on government contracts); CHARLES TIEFER, VEERING RIGHT: HOW
THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION SUBVERTS THE LAW FOR CONSERVATIVE CAUSES (2004)

(criticizing the Bush administration for bending laws to suit its conservative
ideology). For the press commentary, see infra notes 121-22.
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1.2. Brief Chronology: 2002-2003, 2003-2004, and 2005-On
Before analyzing the underlying paradigm of procurementaided unilateralism in Iraq, it is useful to recount summarily the
missteps in rough chronological phases.
The first phase went from 2002 to early 2003: from the preinvasion preparations and the invasion, through the brief start of
the occupation headed by retired General Jay Garner. In this
phase, Secretary Rumsfeld insisted on "military transformation,"
which fostered a unilateral Iraq invasion but overrode the army's
warnings that this meant too few troops to control Iraq
afterwards. 40 Meanwhile, the Bush administration's unilateralism
alienated potential support from other nations 41 and from locals in
Iraq. Unrealistic expectations collapsed in the chaos that launched
the insurgency in early 2003.42
The second phase went from spring 2003 through 2004: the
insurgency's mushrooming that came during the time of the
Coalition Provisional Authority ("CPA") 43 under Ambassador L.
Paul Bremer and the start of the joint military contracting
command, both run largely on Secretary Rumsfeld's orders.44 With
the adoption of the Security Council Resolution 1546 in 2004, the
administration managed a minimalist legitimation of its effort to
transition to a sovereign Iraq government. 45 But, the United States
40 See generally GORDON & TRAINOR, supra note 1 (laying out Rurnsfeld's
commitment to transforming the military); Kitfield, supra note 5, at 310.
41 This particularly included Turkey, to which it had offered billions in
procurement and oil, but whose public could not abide an invasion without
acceptable justification.
42 This included refusing to see the wartime Fedayeen as a serious insurgency
potential, unleashing the post-invasion looting, leaving the borders unsealed, and
being unprepared for civil administration.
43 See Sean D. Murphy, Coalition Laws and Transition Arrangements During
Occupation of Iraq, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 601 (2004) (explaining how international law
impacts American practice in areas 'such as court decisions, immunity, criminal
law, and the use of force).
44 For the significance of the CPA and its end, see Adam Roberts, The End of
Occupation:Iraq 2004, 54 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 27 (2005); for the establishment of the
Joint Contracting Command in Iraq ("JCC-I") during 2004, see Jack L. Cunnane,
The Evolution of Contracting in Iraq March 2003 - March 2005, J. CONT. MGMT.,
Summer 2005, at S47 (2005).
45 For discussion of the legal challenges in legitimating the American
occupation's approach, see Steven Wheatley, The Security Council, Democratic
Legitimacy and Regime Change in Iraq, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 531 (2006); Andrea Carcano,
End of the Occupation in 2004? The Status of the Multinational Force in Iraq After the
Transfer of Sovereignty to the Interim Iraqi Government, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L.
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still stood virtually alone, alienating international and local
support and depending upon administration-loyal
U.S.
contractors. Then came the manipulation of contracts and grants,
initially for the exile figure Ahmed Chalabi, and later for logistics
and security support from large American contractors. This period
included the disbanding of the Iraqi army; the subsequent
dependence upon private military contractors ("PMCs") (which
failed disastrously at training a new one); fatally slow
reconstruction initiatives; 46 the abuse of Iraqi DFI funds; and
47
contractor violations of international law at Abu Ghraib.
The third, mature phase of the debacle of procurement-aided
unilateralism came after 2005. A hand-off of sovereignty to an
interim Iraqi government came in June 2004, with constitutional
and legislative elections in 2005, and a national unity government
in May 2006; meanwhile, Robert Gates, less ideologically
encumbered, took over as Secretary of Defense. Yet, U.S. ground
forces remained hobbled at levels capped by "military
transformation," little affected by the so-called "surge" of 2007,48
with minimal help from the alienated international community.
This left them unable to halt the slide of Iraqi violence from
insurgency to civil strife. Rather, the United States funded
astonishing levels of contractor employees, and purchased
weaponry for Iraqi forces-with "[m]ore than 180,000 civilians...

41, 49 (2006) (arguing that only minimal legitimacy of the government was
accomplished); Gregory H. Fox, The Occupation of Iraq, 36 GEO. J. INT'L L. 195, 25254 (2005) (pointing out the irony of the rhetoric adopted by the Council). See
generally Sujit Choudhry, Old Imperial Dilemmas and the New Nation-Building:
Constitutive Constitutional Politics in Multinational Polities, 37 CONN. L. REV. 933
(2005) (discussing the connection between legitimacy and the right to "self
determination").
46 For a general discussion of the roles of federal agencies in Iraq
reconstruction, see Carl B. Kress, The United States Government and Post-Conflict
Economic Reconstruction,11 U.C. DAvIs J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 75 (2004).
47 See generally P.W. Singer, War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law: Privatized
Military Firms and International Law, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 521 (2004)
(discussing the development laws governing privatized military firms, and the
ensuing difficulties); Tara McKelvey, The Unaccountables, AM. PROSPECT, Sept.
2006, at 45 (describing abuses in Abu Ghraib).
48 The
Congressional Budget Office estimated that "[t]he
Bush
administration's decision earlier this year to temporarily send thousands of
additional troops to Iraq will cost $10 billion if this so-called surge lasts four
months, $22 billion if extended a year, and $40 billion for two years .. " Scully,
War Costs, supra note 4.
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working in Iraq under U.S. contracts" 49 and 110,000 assault rifles
50
and 80,000 pistols gone missing.
In this phase, the evading of accountability takes center stage.
The administration had bitten off in Iraq far more than it proved
able to chew unilaterally, and to hold off the domestic political
repercussions the administration had to relentlessly hide the full
ongoing anticipated scale of the war's cost, now estimated by
economists at as much as $2 trillion.5 ' So, the administration
dodged serious budgeting, including any discipline of military
procurement costs by canceling superfluous high-tech weaponry,
and by abuse of outside-the-budget annual "emergency"
The administration largely
supplemental appropriations.5 2
escaped serious congressional oversight until a Democratic
53
majority took Congress in 2007.
Additionally, this phase was shaped by the belatedly revealed
abuses of contractors like Halliburton, 4 long the monopoly
logistics contractor5 5 to the military in Iraq. 56 Acquisition reform,
49 T. Christian Miller, ContractorsOutnumber Troops in Iraq, L.A. TIMES, July 4,
2007, at Al.
50 See Glenn Kessler, Weapons Given to Iraq are Missing, WASH. POST, Aug. 6,
2007, at Al (describing the missing weaponry); see also Christopher Dickey, Iraq's
Arms Bazaar, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 20, 2007, at 32 (reporting the findings of the
Pentagon).
51 See Linda Bilmes & Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Economic Costs of the Iraq War: An
Appraisal Three Years After the Beginning of the Conflict 30 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 12054, 2006), available at http://www.nber.org/
papers/w12054 (hypothesizing that the total macroeconomic costs will be
between one and two trillion dollars); see also Linda Bilmes & Joseph E. Stiglitz,
Costly Conflict: The Pricetagon the Futile War in Iraq Will Exceed $1 Trillion, ENERGY,
Jan. 1, 2006 (estimating the "true costs" of war at over one trillion).
52 See William Matthews, Shadow Budget: Why Congress Complains About, But
Won't End, Supplemental Appropriations, ARMED FORCES J., Apr. 2006, at 10
(explaining the tactical approach of supplementary budgeting).
53 One oversight mechanism did work, the Special Inspector General for Iraq
Reconstruction, which showed what full oversight in Iraq would have revealed.
Compare Charles Tiefer, The Constitutionality of Independent Officers as Checks on
Abuses of Executive Power, 63 B.U. L. REV. 59 (1983) (discussing the constitutional
and valuable status of independent inspectors general) with Christopher S. Yoo et
al., The Unitary Executive in the Modem Era, 1945-2004, 90 IOWA L. REV. 601 (2005)
(concerning the impairment of executive independence).
54 See Jane Mayer, Contract Sport: What Did the Vice-President Do for
Halliburton?,NEW YORKER, Feb. 16, 2004, at 80 (expanding on Vice President Dick
Cheney's role at Halliburton); see generally DAN BRIODY, THE HALLIBURTON
AGENDA: THE POLITICS OF OIL AND MONEY 191-215 (2004) (discussing Cheney's
former firm).
55 See Michael J. Davidson, Ruck Up: An Introduction to the Legal Issues
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with diminished competition and oversight of contractors, 57 had
opened the way for ineffective and unduly expensive military
support, as well as straining the law of contractor participation in
hostilities. 58 Meanwhile, the reconstruction contractors used or
abused funding without adequate results, leading to a
"reconstruction gap" that afflicted the Iraqi economy as a whole
59
and the key oil sector in particular.
2.

MILITARY TRANSFORMATION, ACQUISITION REFORM,
AND OUTSOURCING: THE RISE AND FALL OF
UNILATERALISM AIDED BY PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES
2.1. The Rise of PMCs to Reduce the Need for U.S. "Boots on the
Ground"
2.1.1.

Military Transformation

"Military transformation" means the shift in military funding
and focus that started in the 1990s, championed by President Bush
as a candidate and then by the Defense Department under
Rumsfeld and Gates. The shift is away from high levels of ground
troops, deemed a "sponge that soaked up much of the funding"6 0
otherwise usable to procure high-tech weaponry. 61 After 9/11,62
Associated with Civilian Contractors on the Battlefield, 29 PuB. CoNT. L.J. 233, 237-38
(2000) (explaining the logistics of a contracting vehicle).
56 The elaboration of the law regarding so-called "contractors on the
battlefield" still left the laws far short of what was actually done in combat. See
Jeffrey F. Addicott, Contractors on the "Battlefield:" Providing Adequate Protection,
Anti-Terrorism Training, and Personnel Recovery for Civilian Contractors
Accompanying the Military in Combat and Contingency Operations,28 Hous. J. INT'L L.
323, 338-44 (2006) (pointing out the legal ambiguities of contractors); see also J.
Ricou Heaton, Civilians at War: Reexamining the Status of Civilians Accompanying the
Armed Forces, 57 A.F. L. REV. 155, 186-95 (2005) (discussing the deficiencies in the
law).
57 See DOLLARS, NOT SENSE, supra note 4, at 29 (discussing the inadequacy of
contract oversight).
m See Michael N. Schmitt, Humanitarian Law and Direct Participation in
Hostilities by Private Contractorsor Civilian Employees, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 511, 519-36
(2005) (explaining the legal difficulties of civilians involved in the conflict).
59 Tellingly, the Iraq Study Group at the end of 2006 pleaded for more
reconstruction funds. Its plea went unheeded, not from lack of merit, but from
alienation of public and international willingness after years of procurementaided unilateralism.
60 GORDON & TRAINOR, supra note 1, at 8.
61 This included very high-cost air and sea vehicles, space-based radar and
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the Bush administration gladdened the procurement industry by
directing the national shock into spending lavishly on high-tech,
63
high-profit military transformation contracting.
This administration dogma of "military transformation" served
as part of its larger unilateralism. A unilateralist United States
could disdain collective security with the Security Council, and
even with NATO, that had worked during the Persian Gulf War,
Bosnia, Kosovo, and even post-9/11 Afghanistan. Instead, the
administration trusted an American military with high-tech
procurement to defeat, acting alone, centrally-organized regular
opposing military forces -but even victory left inadequate "boots
on the ground" for subsequent peacekeeping.
The contracting law aspects of this rising paradigm deserve
note. To create room in the budget either for what was of value in
"military transformation" procurement, and, more importantly, for
expanding American ground forces, involved canceling buys of the
less valued high-tech weapons. 64
But, after 9/11, the
administration would not use its contracting law powers for
canceling those less valued multiyear weapon buys, even as cost
overruns mushroomed. 65 Right down through the proposed
FY2008 budget, the administration stood firm in not canceling any
weapons. 66
weaponry, "netcentric warfare," dubiously effective antimissile warfare, massive
stocks of precision-guided munitions, high-tech intelligence, information
technology gear (e.g., "Future Combat Systems"), and so on.
62 See RiCKS, supra note 1, at 69 (citing Lt. Gen. Johnny Riggs' recollections
regarding the Bush administration's outset in 2001, in order to afford military
transformation: "Rumsfeld's subordinates were hinting to the Army that it might
need to be cut from ten active-duty divisions to eight.").
63 See GORDON & TRAINOR, supra note 1, at 26-29, 48, 53, 91-104 (discussing
the Rumsfeld Department relentlessly talking down the size of the army for Iraq
as not really needing those "boots on the ground").
64 The Rumsfeld Department did start this before 9/11, canceling the
Crusader cannon. See Steven Lee Myers, Pentagon Panel Urges Scuttling Howitzer
System, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 23, 2001, at Al (discussing an advisory panel's
recommendation to cancel production of several new weapon systems).
65 See DoD Acquisitions No Better As Problems Grow, GAO Says, AEROSPACE
DAILY & DEF. REP., April 17, 2006, at 3 (concerning underestimated and expanding
costs of weapons).
66 See Editorial, The Other Defense Budget, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2007, at A20
(commenting that the FY2008 budget gave examples of weapons that "can be
canceled outright," such as nuclear attack submarines and a new-generation
stealth fighter both designed for combat with long-gone Soviet enemies, and a
stealth destroyer ill-adapted for foreseeable naval operations, not to mention
"much of the $15.9 billion going to space weapons and missile defense").
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A superb account, Cobra 11,67 has shed light on how Secretary
Rumsfeld arranged the disastrously low levels of troops for Iraqabout 140,000, compared to the 400,000 used for the Gulf War that
did not even involve an occupation. 68 In late 2001, Secretary
Rumsfeld's military leadership outlined OPLAN 1003-98, "Desert
Crossing," soberly planning for 385,000 troops and an occupation
that might last ten years. 69 Cobra II quoted the response: "[t]he
defense secretary said in exasperation that he did not see why
more than 125,000 troops would be required and even that was
70
probably too many."
As the military devised a variety of plans in 2002-03, Secretary
Rumsfeld clashed head-on with the top military planner who
"wanted the forces for the postwar period," 71 relentlessly bringing
down the troop number. 72 At a 2003 hearing, Army Chief of Staff
Eric Shinseki publicly testified to a need for several hundred
73
thousand troops, based on an expert army study seeking 260,000.
This was the army's most public rebellion against Secretary

67 GORDON & TRAINOR, supra note 1.
68 After 9/11, President Bush's White House had taken potent legal steps to
handle its planning to invade Iraq in deepest secrecy. Specifically, he initiated the
process with a National Security Presidential Directive, more suited to quiet,
unnoticed, covert action work than to an invasion the whole world would know
was coming.
69 See GORDON & TRAINOR, supra note 1, at 26 (describing a military plan to
secure northern Iraq which was later dismissed by Rumsfeld). This represented
the thinking -ironically dubbed the "Powell Doctrine"-from back when Colin
Powell was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. See, e.g., The Powell Doctrine
Revisited, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 1, 2003, at 31 (citing the Powell Doctrine as the
principle that "force should be used only in defence of America's vital national
interests and, when applied, should be decisive").
70 GORDON & TRAINOR, supra note 1, at 4.

71 Id. at 98. When the planners told Secretary Rumsfeld in December 2002
they wanted to put aside such optimistic plans to prepare a realistic plan to
handle occupation duties as well, "[tlhe defense secretary suggested recruiting
Arab nations to do peacekeeping duty in Iraq after Saddam was toppled." Id. at
93.
72 It took a year for Secretary Rumsfeld to beat down the warnings of his
career army officers that too-low troop levels in occupied Iraq would be
disastrous. By December 2001, he had gotten the number to 385,000, then 300,000,
then 275,000, then (by April 2002) a force to end at 250,000 but start off at 145,000.
Id. at 28-29.
73 See RICKS, supra note 1, at 96-97 (discussing Shinseki's appearance at
Capitol Hill to argue against the war plan being devised under Rumsfeld's
supervision).
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Rumsfeld's reducing the number of troops, and he punished it
74
harshly.
By the Bush administration's unilateralism, it grossly failed at
gaining international support, especially support from crucial
neighboring states, notably Turkey, 75 and it "poisoned the prospect
of Turkish help with stability operations after the war." 76 U.S.
intelligence missed the significance of armed Iraqi paramilitary
forces necessitating big occupying forces, 77 from over-reliance on
satellite, overhead, and electronic reconnaissance, the "military
transformation" ways of obtaining intelligence. 78
The Rumsfeld-arranged absence of more American 79 and
international forces for occupation brought disaster: disorder in
the cities, unsealed borders, and an insurgency starting in the
region with the smallest local American troop presence, the Anbar
Province, in late April 2003.80 As this grew, 81 climaxes came in the

74 First, Secretary Rumsfeld indicated that he deemed Shinseki's explanation
ludicrous, and on his instruction, Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz spread the
complaint that Shinseki was off base. Second, the DOD soon announced
Shinseki's successor's name, many months ahead of schedule, prematurely
rendering him a lame duck, and direly warning anyone else against such frank
testimony to Congress. The DOD thereby gave a major example of its approach of
evasion of accountability. GORDON & TRAINOR, supra note 1, at 102-03.
75 See id. at 306, 344 (discussing how tensions with foreign states created
significant barriers to the army's objectives).
76 PHILLIPS, supra note 3, at 120.
77 Id. at 155 ("Bremer's decree banning the Iraqi armed forces was a tactical
miscalculation with serious strategic consequences.").
78 See GORDON & TRAINOR, supra note 1, at 61-62 (discussing the breadth of
the Iraqi military forces).
79 With the fall-off of centrally directed Iraqi combat, Rumsfeld employed his
power to "off-ramp" units the army had planned to bring in for the occupation.
At Secretary Rumsfeld's directions, the "deployment of the sixteen-thousandstrong 1st Cavalry Division was officially canceled on April 21." Id. at 461.
Secretary Rumsfeld's spokesman pronounced his vision of withdrawing the vast
majority of the American forces in three to four months. See id. at 464 (stating
Rumsfeld's desire to avoid an indefinite stay in Iraq). Wolfowitz indicated that
'within a few months of the invasion the U.S. troop level in Iraq would be thirtyfour thousand ....
" RICKS, supra note 1, at 97.
80 See GORDON & TRAINOR, supra note 1, at 462 (discussing the death of 17
Iraqis in Fallujah which led to a grenade attack against the 3rd Armored Cavalry
Regiment).
81 Bomb explosions aimed at Americans and other foreigners began,
culminating in the terrible August 2003 terrorist truck-bombing of the United
Nations compound that killed the highly-regarded senior troubleshooter Sergio
Vieira de Mello, which "essentially drove the international body out of Iraq."
DIAMOND, supra note 1, at 57.
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army battle to occupy Falluja in April 2004 and a confrontation
with Shiite militia in Najaf.
The all-important tradeoff by Secretary Rumsfeld of troop
strength for the "military transformation" procurement of highprofit, high-tech gear raises other legal issues. In the wake of
scandals of the 1980s and 1990s, a whole system of development
for
testing, and other legally controlled requirements
procurement, 82 grew up 83 to avoid military agencies spending
lavishly in a "rush to failure." 84 The Bush administration had to
undercut the law of testing, to let contractors sell dubious "military
85
transformation."
From 2004 on, the low American troop levels resulting from the
high-tech weaponry contracts of "military transformation" became
the subject of repeated congressional debates and votes.
Congressional leaders of an unimpeachable "hawkish" stance,
such as Sen. John McCain, led the fight to enlarge the army. 86 On
82 This fell under its own vital if obscure corner of the government
contracting law. See R. E. Besal & Steven K. Whitehead, Operational Testing:
Redefining Industry Role, NAT'L DEF., Sept. 2001, at 38, available at
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/ issues/2001/Sep/OperationalTestin
g.htm (agreeing that contractors and operational testers should work together
more closely and directly, but refuting the contention that providing contractors
with greater access to program documentation would lead to a more efficient and
effective acquisition process).
83 See Eric Umansky, Studs and Duds, WASH. MONTHLY, Dec. 2001, at 15
(noting the shift toward earlier operational testing of weapons by the military and
the need for such testing considering the costly failure of some weapons that were
not tested early enough).
84 See Philip E. Coyle III, Evolutionary Acquisition: Seven Ways to Know If You
Are Placing Your Program at Unnecessary Risk, PROGRAM MANAGER, Nov.-Dec. 2000,
at 2 (noting that a rush for new technology in the army has led to delays and
problems).
85 Leading the way was the outright dismantling of the law of development
testing as to missile defense, necessary because of how embarrassingly it failed so
many tests. Similarly, Secretary Rumsfeld's beloved "Future Combat Systems"
drew scorn from how the law of development testing had to be watered down to
keep it in receipt of its massive payments. The dilution of the law of testing
allowed each of these to wastefully soak up as much precious defense funding as
an extra army division that could have pacified half a Sunni province at a crucial
juncture.
86 They could point to the overwhelming reasons that the military struggling
in the Iraq war could ill afford to spend so much, on so many expensive defense
contracts for weapons that are of no use in the war instead of on troops. See
William Matthews, "Right-Sizing" the Force: Capitol Hill, Pentagon Parry Over Army
End Strength, ARMED FORCES J., Sept. 2003, at 8 (noting that there is an asset and
requirement mismatch in Iraq, as the troops are overburdened and in need more
people, but the administration is instead concentrating on improving weaponry
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the other side, the administration successfully resisted, saying
more troops were too expensive, and imagining the absence of a
87
long-term need for troops in Iraq.
2.1.2.

Acquisition Reform and Outsourcing

"Acquisition reform" 88 started in the 1990s, in its milder and
more benign form under the Clinton administration. 89 It included
less formal checks upon awarding and supervising government
contracts, like full and open competition, in those contexts when
market-like mechanisms assuredly would take their place in
controlling costs. With the invasion and occupation of Iraq, it took
on a radical form. Radical acquisition reform makes wide use of
loose diverse contractual "vehicles" to fill needs, and attempts
extreme contracting-out of services. 90
During contract
administration, radical acquisition reform replaces relatively more
serious oversight by contract managers, with much looser checks.
Radical acquisition reform means abandoning the traditional
formal checks notwithstanding the lack of market-like control
mechanisms to take their place. 91
and technology to be more effective). It seems implausible that the administration
could so successfully resist, in Congress, a step so generally accepted as needed by
the army in wartime-if the administration could not call on a strong base of
support both in the high-profit defense contractor industry, and in the states and
districts where that industry provides employment.
87 See George C. Wilson, Army Stuck in a New Catch-22, NAT'L J.,
Oct. 11, 2003,
at 3134 (noting that the government is overworking the troops stationed in Iraq
because to increase the troop size there would be an acknowledgement by the
Bush administration of its commitment to keep troops there for more years to
come).
88 See, e.g., Steve Kelman, The Procurement System: Backwards to Bureaucracy?,
PUB. MANAGER., Sept. 22, 2004, at 9 (stating that the primary goal of acquisition
reform should be attaining the best value rather than transparency, competition or
integrity).
89 Vice President Gore initially championed it, and an intensification of it
found favor with the Republican Congress. See Tiefer & Stroman, supra note 11.
90 These enable Defense Department contracting officers to place purchase
orders by using loose contractual "vehicles" in civilian agencies, and to contractout such services as the training and operational support of Iraqi police and
military units. See Major Michael C. Wong, Current Problems with Multiple Award
Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity Contracts:A Primer, ARMY LAW., Sept. 2006, at
17 (describing the process by which the army contracts out to multiple vendors in
order to increase flexibility).
91 During award, it replaces full and open competition with diminished or no
competition, most notably with loose awards of indefinite quantity contracts
followed by uncompleted task or delivery orders.
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Such radical acquisition reform operates with a much-reduced
appointees
and
workforce,
giving
political
acquisition
administration-loyal contractors almost a free hand to use the
taxpayer's funds to prop up, or at least to appear to prop up, a
unilateral war. Infamous examples include the sole-source award
to Halliburton to handle the Iraqi oil field reconstruction, and the
interrogation services at Abu Ghraib brought on by a contractual
92
vehicle set up by the Interior Department.
2.2. The Failureof PMCs to Replace Internationaland Local Military
Support
2.2.1.

Contractor Training's Failureto Replace the Disbanded
Local Army

In the early occupation, the administration's worst mistake was
its decree disbanding the Iraqi army.93 It erred so plainly 94 that
several months later, Bremer reversed course, and, too late, tried to
re-recruit the now long-gone former Iraqi army. 95 The disbanding
forfeited the United States' potential influence over the officers and
soldiers of the old Iraqi army. 96 Instead, disgruntled officers,
92 See Schooner, supra note 15, at 549 (suggesting that the lack of army
oversight over the contractors that it hires has led to serious ethical concerns).
93 Some think Chalabi maneuvered Bremer into this, and while Deputy
Secretary Wolfowitz cleared this in advance, Secretary Rumsfeld may have been
surprised. See RICKS, supra note 1, at 163-64 (discussing various reactions to the
dissolution of the Iraqi army). Bremer's order even went so far as to refuse some
Iraqi army retirees their retirement pay. See id. at 162-63 (noting Bremer's order
"clarified his de-Baathification standard" in refusing pension payments to those
deemed a Senior Party Member under the former regime).
94 This went against contrary military advice and the policy established, preinvasion, apparently at the presidential level. An Iraq conference at the National
Defense University in November 2002 "strongly recommended against a swift,
uncoordinated dissolution of the Iraqi military. 'There should be a phased downsizing to avoid dumping 1.4 million men into a shattered economy.'" Id. at 72.
95 Bremer's subsequent defensive comments have not been to try to claim that
the dissolution of the Iraqi army was good. Rather, the administration's lame
excuse has been that the army had already dissolved after defeat, so the
disbanding order was just a formality. That is unpersuasive. Officers and
soldiers alike were highly dependent upon their pay, and the weak Iraqi economy
offered them little wholesome in the way of alternatives. The Iraqi army did not
disband itself; Bremer did it.
96 Iraqi soldiers and retirees did not receive that much pay -it was no great
economy to cut them off-but, until they were cut off, their pay served as the
basis of controlling the army's hundreds of thousands of fighting men with their
easy access to arms.
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soldiers, and retirees created a large pool for the growth of both the
Sunni insurgency and the Shiite militias. 97 What made the mistake
possible - and
worsened
its
consequences - was
the
administration's excessive reliance on procurement to aid its
unilateralism. The consultative requirements of multilateral action
might have avoided this capital blunder. Bush administration
officials, effectively acting alone, apparently felt contractors stood
ready to provide adequate support.
The government has its own trainers and equipment-buyers,
both in the CIA and in military Special Forces. They can do a
superb job, as shown in their speedy, effective building up of the
Northern Alliance to take on the Taliban in the post-9/11 Afghan
campaign. However, contractors sold DOD in Iraq on another
alternative. The Rumsfeld Department, to keep down the number
of troops in Iraq, naturally placed reliance in disbanding the Iraqi
army to procure contractor "equip and train" services 98 to create a
new Iraqi army. 99 The administration awarded contracts to
Military Professional Resources Incorporated ("MPRI") 100 and the
Vinnell Corporation, which is a subsidiary of Northrop Grumman
and which has the major training contract for the Saudi Arabian
97 They were not crushed or dishonorable in their own eyes; they felt they
had given a decent account of themselves in dealing with such redoubtable foes as
Iran (1980-88) and the United States (1991, 2003).
98 An entire niche of the privatized military industry provides the military
consulting services of equipping and training army units, led by MPRI. Leading
scholar Peter W. Singer devotes a book chapter -chapter 8 in CorporateWarriorsto the poster child of the new military consulting, MPRI. MPRI is run by former
senior United States military officers, with offices near the Pentagon, and does
much military training, at home and abroad, for the DOD. During the crucial
mid-to-late-1990s in the former Yugoslavia, the United States used this leading
firm in Croatian, Bosnian, and Kosovar endeavors. See SINGER, supra note 24, at
119-35; see also sources cited supra note 37 (analyzing the decision by the Clinton
administration, with which a Republican Congress grudgingly went along, to
send troops to Bosnia in 1995 and noting a very key part of the arrangement for
the Republican Congress was precisely this equip-and-train mission that MPRI
performed).
99 "'The feeling was manpower-why waste precious Special Forces
manpower when you can get pretty much the same thing with Vinnell and MPRI?
...
[T]he Sec Def [Rumsfeld] told us, 'These precious Special Forces guys have
been busy . . . and didn't need to be wasting their time training Iraqis . ...'"
RICKS, supra note 1, at 328 (quoting Col. Gregory Gardner, in turn quoting
Secretary Rumsfeld).
100 See Peter W. Singer, Warriors for Hire in Iraq, SALON.COM, Apr. 15, 2004,
http://dir.salon.com/story/news/feature/2004/04/15/warriors/index.html
(noting these organizations have been engaged in the costly training and
equipping of the new Iraq army).
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military. 101 Also, it awarded a contract to Erinys, another big
private military company, which between 2003 and 2004 trained
and mobilized a 16,000-man "guard force" to protect oil
02
pipelines.'
Another contract to do the equipping - the buying of arms went to Nour USA. This award was a striking example of one type
of procurement unilateralism - harmfully excluding companies
abroad while foreign inclusion in competition would broaden the
support for a multilateral action.1 0 3 As the facts about Nour USA
emerged, in March 2004 the DOD decided to cancel Nour's
contract and re-award it. Nour USA had just been set up under a
longtime close friend of Ahmed Chalabi, who will be discussed
later. At the time, NBC-TV's investigative unit did a study of the
Nour USA award,1 04 and the author, when asked, commented that
"[y]ou can't justify taking a company that was just created last May
and say that they have the past experience that's required." 105
As to the training contracts to MPRI and Vinnell, they turned
out to be disastrous failures. When DOD put the new Iraqi army to
the test in spring 2004 by sending units out to deal with insurgents,
the units would not fight, especially against insurgents of their
own sect (Sunni or Shiite).106 Army Special Forces disagreed with
101For a description of Vinnell's background, see Center for Public Integrity's
website, http://www.publicintegrity.org/wow.
102 See Jeremy Grant, US Bill for Iraq Private Security Soars, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 13,
2007, at 8 (discussing the increase in funds awarded to Erinys from its original
contract).
103 Particularly important competitors were a Polish outfit, since, among
other matters, Poland supported the invasion and expected a fair chance at such a
contract.
104 See Lisa Myers, Iraq Rebuilding Contract on Hold: Bid Rechecked After Charges
of Inexperience and Favoritism, MSNBC.coM, Mar. 4, 2004, http://www.msnbc
.msn.com/id/4441088/ (providing an account of the hold on Nour USA's contract
to equip the new Iraqi army).
105 Nour USA contended that it had extensive past experience and had made
a credible bid of $330 million. However, NBC found that the company had been
created the previous spring, and that its bid was viewed by competitors as lowballing- getting a contract by an unsupportable underbid with the expectation of
charging more later. Peter W. Singer commented that the Nour USA contract reaward resulted "in months of delay in the vital task of readying an Iraqi army."
Singer, supra note 100.
106 The contractors' training approach prepared trainees only for an
improbable external problem like an Iranian invasion and not at all for the
immediate actual problem of the internal insurgency. Maj. Gen. Paul D. Eaton, of
such stature that his post before Iraq was commander of all army infantry training
at Fort Benning, Georgia, "found that a civilian contractor hired to conduct
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Secretary Rumsfeld's position that it was better to use consultants
rather than Special Forces for the training, and "heavily criticized"
the contractor training. 10 7
The army's Central Command
terminated the contracts' 08 and replaced the private contractors
with government trainers, notably including-years too late-a
contribution from NATO. Meanwhile, a $1.8 billion contract for
DynCorp (a subsidiary of the procurement giant L-3
Communications) to train the Iraqi police was cancelled in 2004,
but payment continued until 2006, with the Special Inspector
General giving a harsh report in 2007.109
It is hard to overstate this disaster of disbanding the Iraqi army
in part from a procurement-aided unilateralism paradigm of
relying upon contractors to equip and train a new army. This
situation provides lessons about not basing security on PMC-aided
unilateralism. 110
2.2.2.

Contractors' "Abu Ghraib" Alienation from International
and Local Support

Another horrific subject-the "Abu Ghraib" tactics-also
illustrated the abuses possible from radical "acquisition reform."
In explaining the abuses of law underlying Abu Ghraib, some legal
observers have emphasized the lines of legal reasoning approved

training would be incapable of imparting military skills and discipline -what he
called 'soldierization.'"
Thom Shanker, General Says Training of Iraqi Troops
Suffered from Poor Planningand Staffing, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2006, at A6.
107 RICKS, supra note 1, at 368 (citing criticism from Special Forces officers who
felt the Special Forces were used improperly at the expense of leaving the training
of Iraqis to contractors).
108 A Special Forces expert in counterinsurgency told a congressional
committee that "American observers from U.S. Central Command headquarters
assessed the military basic training conducted under contract by the Vinnell
Corporation to be unsatisfactory, and the contract was terminated." RIcKS, supra
note 1, at 372.
109 See Megan Scully, Update on Iraq Contracting Problems Alarms Lawmakers,
CONGRESSDAILY, May 10, 2007, http;//nationaljournal.com/pubs/congressdaily/
(discussing the contract awarded to DynCorp in relation to increased findings of
contracting problems in Iraq); see also Peter H. Stone, Iraq Contractors on Defense,
NAT'L J., Mar. 3, 2007, at 76 (discussing congressional probes into the waste of tax
dollars spent on Iraq construction projects as a result of mismanagement and
fraud).
110 Yet, remarkably little congressional oversight occurred about this
procurement failure. The lack of funding accountability is discussed infra.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol29/iss1/1

2007]

THE IRAQ DEBACLE

by the Bush White House' that minimized the applicability to
American forces of the Geneva Convention and other prohibitions
against detainee abuse in Iraq." 2 But, procurement was key, too.
As one observer sums up, "[t]he Army relied upon two relevant
contractual agreements for operations at the Abu Ghraib prison:
CACI International provided more than half of the interrogators
employed at the facility, while Titan supplied linguistics
personnel.... [M]ore than a third of the improper incidents
involved contractor personnel.""13 The outsourcing for the Abu
Ghraib interrogations'1 4 accorded particularly with "employee
augmentation,"" 5 that is, contracting to make up for the shortage
116
of army personnel in Iraq.
Abu Ghraib tactics were more than just the abuse of detainees;
they were the center of an array of ill-advised military tactics, like
a
particularly
operations
that were
cordon-and-sweep
dysfunctional side of procurement-aided unilateralism." 7 These
111See Sean D. Murphy, Executive Branch Memoranda on Status and Permissible
Treatment of Detainees, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 820 (2004) (providing an account of the
developments of the Bush administration's considerations toward the treatment
of detainees in relation to the Third Geneva Convention); Evan J. Wallach, The
Logical Nexus Between the Decision to Deny Application of the Third Geneva Convention
to the Taliban and al Qaeda and the Mistreatment of Prisoners in Abu Ghraib, 36 CASE
W. RES. J. INT'L L. 541 (2004) (examining the basis of the U.S. government's
determination that Guantdnamo detainees are unprotected by the Third Geneva
Convention).
112 See Brower, supra note 16 (examining the function and importance of legal
personality and the United States' need to commit to the rule of law in light of the
interrogation procedures in Iraq and the inhumane treatment of prisoners in Abu
Ghraib).
113 Schooner, supra note 15, at 555.
114 The outsourcing represented the overcoming by the Bush administration
of a long-standing congressional prohibition against personal services contracting.
115 See Schooner, supra note 15, at 561 (defining employee augmentation,
which is "an increasingly common form of personal services contract").
116 Among other troubling aspects, there was a gross inadequacy of training,
as well as an absence of guidance, by either army personnel or contractor
personnel to deal with this situation. See id. at 562-64 (illustrating the problems
with using contractual personnel to augment the government work force,
especially the lack of appropriate training and supervision for these personnel
and the lack of understanding of the appropriate relationship between the various
government personnel).
117 These tactics compensated for the insufficient number of U.S. ground
troops, the lack of human intelligence (not replaceable by "military
transformation" methods), and related problems caused by massive cordon-andFrom the
sweep operations in which thousands of Iraqis were detained.
heartland of the Sunni insurgency, a substantial fraction of the detainees got
dumped in one overcrowded facility: Abu Ghraib.
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tactics "aided the insurgency it was aiming to crush by alienating
large segments of the Iraqi population." 118 They also alienated
world public opinion, boxing the United States' effort in Iraq into a
unilateral status that seemed increasingly condemned and isolated.
While the military proceeded in legal action against scores of
soldiers implicated in abusing Iraqis, in 2005 no contractor
employees had been charged for such offenses, and by late 2006,
only one contractor employee had been charged." 9 The exposure
of Abu Ghraib hardly changed the army's dependence upon this
kind of "employee augmentation." A five-year contract begun in
March 2007 arranged for DynCorp to provide up to $4.6 billion in
translators and interpreters for U.S. forces in Iraq 20
2.2.3.

Depending Upon Outsourcing to Halliburtonand Private
Security

The subject of the failure in Iraq of the procurement law and
policy stance, characterized by diminished competition and
oversight of contractors, is one that the Author has commented on
in the broadcast 121 and print' 22 press. Outsourcing to Halliburton
118 RICKS, supra note 1, at 200.
119 See Tara McKelvey, The Unaccountables, AM. PROSPECT, Sept. 7, 2006, at 44,
45-46, 48 (citing a contract interrogator's indictment for assaulting a detainee who
later died).
120 Dyncorp Awarded $4.6 Billion US Army Linguist Contract, FINANCIALWIRE,
Dec. 19, 2006.
121 See generally Archives of the National Public Radio Marketplace,
http://marketplace.publicradio.org/shows/,
with particular emphasis on
Newscast: Contractors with CACI and Titan Implicated in Iraqi Prisoner Abuse
Scandals Are Now Being Investigated by the Department of Justice, held by
American Public Media (Aug. 26, 2004), available at http://marketplace
.publicradio.org/shows/2004/08/26_mpp.html); see also Auditing Reconstruction
in Iraq, held by American Public Media Uune 22, 2004), available at
http://www.marketplace.org/play/audio.php?media=/2004/06/22-mpp&start
=00:00:08:31.0&end=00:00:12:51.0) (interview with Gordon Adams).
122 The Author quoted in the Washington Post: Charles R. Babcock & Renae
Merle, U.S. Accuses Pairof Rigging Iraq Contracts, WASH. PosT, Nov. 18, 2005, at Al
(quoting the Author on complaints at home and abroad that the United States was
not "protecting the integrity of Iraqi money" from contractor fraud and noting
that recent indictments were an important step); Dana Hedgpeth, Judge Clears
Contractor of Fraud in Iraq, WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 2007, at D1 (noting that the high
level of proof required by the Fourth Circuit in contractor fraud cases would
result in difficulty for taxpayers to recover money lost to contracting abuses);
Ellen McCarthy, CACI Contracts Blocked: Current Work in Iraq Can Continue, WASH.
POST, May 26, 2004, at A18 (questioning the role of Department of Interior
contractors in Iraq and warning of the potential for abuse); Jackie Spinner,
Contracts to Rebuild Iraq Go to Chosen Few, WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 2003, at El (noting
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and private security represented an enduring feature of the
problem.
To briefly note the relevant history, Halliburton (via its former
subsidiary Kellogg, Brown & Root, or "KBR") had long been a
major military construction contractor. 123 In the 1990s, it took over
the new business of troop logistics outsourcing, or Logistics Civil
Augmentation Program ("LOGCAP"). 124 In Iraq, Halliburton held
that contract ("LOGCAP III") on a monopoly basis, a virtual "fifth
the administration's lack of credibility in citing tight deadlines and security
concerns as the reasoning for no-bid contracts that favor political allies); Jackie
Spinner, Halliburton Unit Loses Out on Rebuilding Iraq, WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 2003, at
A13 (linking non-competitive bidding with political influence and campaign
contributions); Karen DeYoung & Jackie Spinner, Contract for Rebuilding of Iraq
Awarded to Bechtel: U.S. Firm 1 of 6 Invited to Bid for $680 Million Project, WASH.
PosT, Apr. 18, 2003, at A23 (commenting on broad indemnification authority
granted to bidders for Iraq reconstruction contracts); Renae Merle, Air Force Erred
With No-Bid Iraq Contract, GAO Says, WASH. POST, Feb. 29, 2005, at A17
(commenting on a no-bid contract awarded to a company employing Iraqi exiles
as political agents).
The Author quoted in the Los Angeles Times: David Streitfeld, Nancy Cleeland
& Mark Fineman, Builders Look at Iraq Project as Open Door: Amid Criticism About
the Secret Process, Companies Bid for a $600-Million Contract, Hopingfor Much Bigger
Deals to Come, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2003, at Al (commenting on the advantages of
cost-plus-fee contracts); David Streitfeld & Mark Fineman, Secret Contracting
Process to Rebuild Iraq Draws Criticism, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2003, at A14
(confirming the unusual nature of USAID's top procurement official appearing in
front of congressional committees twice in the same week); T. Christian Miller,
Appointee's Role in HalliburtonPact Told: Waxman Asks Cheney for Facts on the Award
of a Controversial Iraq Oil Field Contract, L.A. TIMES, June 14, 2004, at A7
(commenting on the bypass of career government contracting officers in order to
push through deals favoring Halliburton); T. Christian Miller, Poland, Spain Up in
Arms Over Loss of Iraq Contract: The Allies Ask Why Their Weapons Suppliers Were
Passed Over for an Inexperienced U.S. Firm, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2004, at A6
(recommending that allegations of low-bidding contracts with the intention of
forcing the government to later raise the price "deserve very serious
investigation").
123 Notably, during the Vietnam War, the company was part of a construction
consortium that Halliburton chronicler, Dan Briody, says "did 97 percent of the
construction work in the country during the seven years they operated there."
BRIODY, supra note 54, at 165.
124 This is an indefinite quantity contractual vehicle for providing the
military - particularly at overseas bases - with food, laundry, cleaning, and other
basic services. For details, see Davidson, supra note 55, at 237-38; Karen DaPonte
Thornton, Fine Tuning Acquisition Reform's Favorite Procurement Vehicle, the
Indefinite Delivery Contract, 31 PuB. CONT. L.J. 383 (2002) (offering suggestions on
reform of the "indefinite delivery" system and the role of government
contractors). In 2001, Halliburton held the pertinent LOGCAP contract, and with
the invasion of Iraq, it automatically became the logistics supplier to the
occupation and subsequent effort.
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service" in the military until 2007 when DOD awarded a set of
contracts ("LOGCAP IV") to divide the Iraq LOGCAP among
Halliburton and two other suppliers. By then it "had been paid
$19.7 billion for its work under the contract," and going forward,
the overall contract covering Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kuwait was,
for each supplier, "worth up to $5 billion a year and could be
extended for up to nine more years." 125
The LOGCAP contract lets Halliburton bill, for being logistics
supplier to the American effort in Iraq, on a cost-reimbursement
plus award fee basis, i.e., a cost-plus-profit-plus-bonus basis. This
gave Halliburton a negative incentive to hold down costs in a very
high-cost environment. The LOGCAP contract proved extremely
expensive for the United States. 26
As noted elsewhere,
Halliburton also obtained, in a very dubious sole-source way, the
contract to restore the oil fields in Iraq, which was worth billions.
When the successor contract was divided in two, Halliburton
1 27
dubiously won the award of the lucrative southern half.
Between 2001 and 2006, Halliburton subsidiary Kellogg, Brown &
Root received $15 billion from the Pentagon.128
The problem was not one of flaws attributable to the
Halliburton employees.
In fact, Halliburton employees kept
convoys of supplies moving without bottlenecks and did work to
repair the oil facilities as a part of reconstruction efforts. 129 They
did not run away during crises. Individual Halliburton employees
exhibited impressive bravery and patriotism.
On the other hand, Halliburton's corporate role raised major

Dana Hedgpeth, Army Splits Award Among 3 Firms: FormerHalliburton Unit
Retains Piece of Massive War Services Contract, WASH. POST, June 28,2007, at A8.
126 See Davidson, supra note 55, at 238 ("LOGCAP suffers from a major
shortcoming-utilization of expensive cost-plus-award-fee contracts.").
127 A Bechtel insider subsequently published a book revealing the ostensibly
full-and-open competition for that southern contract as fraud. See SHERYL ELAM
TAPPAN, SHOCK AND AWE IN FORT WORTH: How THE U.S. ARMY RIGGED THE "FREE
125

AND OPEN

COMPETITION"

CONTRACT IN IRAQ (2004).

TO REPLACE HALLIBURTON'S SOLE-SOURCE

OIL FIELD

Even Bechtel, normally willing to bid against
Halliburton for such contracts, simply let Halliburton take the southern contract.
See David R. Baker, Consultant Slams Halliburton Contract, S.F. CHRON., July 29,
2004, at C1 (detailing Sheryl Elam Tappan's motivation for publishing her expos6
of favoritism in government contracting).
128 Kopecki, supra note 14, at 55.
129 See Faleh al-Khayat, Iraq's Southern Oil Output Resumes, at a Reduced Level,
PLATr'S OILGRAM PRICE REP., Jan. 4, 2006, at 1 (detailing achievements in
reconstructing oil fields and increasing oil production).
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procurement questions from several angles. First, scandals about
inflated costs dogged the company, 130 and were laid out in a series
of reports by the investigations staff of the House Committee on
Government Reform 131 and countless press reports, including a
number quoting the Author criticizing Halliburton overcharging
on big contracts and reports in the Los Angeles Times, the
Washington Post, and the National Public Radio Marketplace
show. 132 The scandals included such performance as providing
untreated, highly polluted water right out of the sewage-ridden
Euphrates River to an American base. 133
Second, the administration repeatedly overruled its DOD
Defense Contract Audit Agency
("DCAA")
to protect
Halliburton. 3 4 For example, out of $263 million in payment for
fuel purchases and other equipment in auditor challenges to
Halliburton, the Defense Department paid all but $10 million. 35
Third, DOD's willingness to pay the exorbitant cost, despite the

130 The most famous specific scandal concerned DOD tasking Halliburton to
buy gasoline for import for the Iraqis, which it did from a suspicious Kuwaiti
intermediary. It turned out that the Pentagon's own fuel supply agency had a
contract to import the military's fuel for half the Halliburton charge. MILLER,
supra note 3, at 87. Halliburton needed a highly unusual waiver of "certified cost
and pricing" data requirements on that fuel contract, which it obtained even more
unusually by end-running the senior contracting officer, Bunnatine Greenhouse,
and getting it from the very head of the army corps himself. Id. at 89-90.
131 See, e.g., DOLLARS, NOT SENSE, supra note 4.
132 See supra notes 121-22.
133 RASOR & BAUMANN, supra note 1, at 145-56.
134 This combined with the dubious sole-source awarding of Halliburton's
contracts to give substantial color to the widespread suspicion of protective
favoritism tracing to the powerful ties of Secretary Rumsfeld and Vice President
Cheney. For example, the DCAA found that Halliburton incurred unreasonable
and unsupported costs of over two hundred million dollars on its oil restoration
contract, mostly as to the oil importing. See MILLER, supra note 3, at 89; David
Ivanovich, Being Timely Was Key to Halliburton Bonuses: Army Rejected Most
Objections About Iraq Bills, Hous. CHRON., Feb. 28, 2006, at Bus. 1.
135 MILLER, supra note 3, at 89. In so doing, DOD gave full credit to the waiver
of cost and pricing data, signed in Greenhouse's place by her deputy, who
"described his role as essentially a yes-man to allow top [Army Corps of
Engineers] officials to go behind Greenhouse's back." MILLER, supra note 3, at 90.
The general law about giving face value to such waivers, many lawyers for
government contractors might say, shields Halliburton from the double penalties
for severe violations of the defective pricing rules. But the waiver was obtained in
circumstances raising so many questions about the appearance of political
interference that it should have taken a great deal of further investigation before
DOD could rest easy completely overruling the DCAA auditors and letting
Halliburton off scot-free for the matter.
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indignation of the career DOD contracting officers and auditors,
exposed a fundamental reason the Rumsfeld Department made
such extensive and indulgent use of Halliburton's LOGCAP.
Recall that Secretary Rumsfeld fought hard to post only a low -too
low -number of troops to Iraq. In times past, American combat
units sustained themselves logistically with help from support
units - engineering, transport, labor, and the like - but Secretary
Rumsfeld ardently desired not to send these, to keep the illusion of
a low number of troops needed, and those temporarily. He
continued with this even though the help he expected from other
countries, and from a newly trained Iraqi army, did not
materialize.
A Congressional Budget Office study 136 found that the U.S.
Army could have used 41,000 additional troops to completely
replace Halliburton without added wartime costs. 1 37 The wasteful
and costly Halliburton contracting served a primarily political
function needed to sustain the illusion of procurement-aided
unilateralism. The administration balked sharply at other steps publicly increasing its troop commitment, until the far-too-late
2007 "surge" -that would signify frankly its long-term, high-cost,
1 38
high-casualty unilateral war in Iraq.
136

CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, LoGisTIcs SUPPORT FOR DEPLOYED MILITARY FORCES,

30(2005).
137 See Kopecki, supra note 14, at 55 ("To perform the tasks KBR completed,
the U.S. Army would have had to recruit 41,000 additional troops and spend $8.2
billion, or $2.8 billion more than KBR's costs, the CBO found."). The principal
cost difference between keeping and replacing Halliburton did not concern the
relatively similar wartime costs of the personnel, but rather their peacetime costs
after the war. This gave rise to a CBO proposal to establish a logistics reserves
corps. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 136, at 60 (proposing a logistical
reserve corps).
Another way of putting this is that the beleaguered United States Army in
Iraq could have been strengthened by 41,000 additional troops, primarily with
logistical duties but also available for combat assignments at crucial times,
without additional wartime costs. That is, troops could have rotated part of the
time to do field rather than support functions, and would have been part of the
same command and mission as the troops in the field. Having Halliburton,
instead, may very well not have saved money nor made them stronger, but just
soaked up money better spent on troops.
138 The administration did not want to acknowledge troop needs of the Iraq
counter-insurgency, presenting it as a limited part of the overall global war on
terror, and a temporary part that was always just about to turn the comer with the
latest development in Iraqi politics. Meanwhile, to maximize the stream of highprofit "military transformation" contracting, the administration must fend off the
previously-described congressional demands to expand the army by a minimal
but vitally needed 40,000. See generally Michael Kilian, Rumsfeld to Bolster
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Halliburton support services had served before, albeit on a
smaller scale, this function of enabling the White House to manage
and contain the apparent scale of a major army occupation. 139
Halliburton's LOGCAP role, from its first contract in 1992, had
been to help in a series of commitments -Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti,
and the former Yugoslavia -where the administrations wanted
fewer troops so as not to strain public support. 140
Thus,
Halliburton's controversial legal trademarks-not full and open
competition, problems with performance, and audits resolved by
political help- signified something special.
The Bush
administration's acceptance of Halliburton, and the pardoning of
its flaws, was the price of the appearance of a limited Iraq force
commitment, even without international support-i.e., the
paradigm of procurement-aided unilateralism.
More broadly, criticism developed of a fundamentally flawed
command strategy, dramatically publicized in 2007 when "[a]n
active-duty army officer publish[ed] a blistering attack on U.S.
generals, saying they have botched the war in Iraq and misled
Congress about the situation there." 141 The article, published in the
Armed Forces Journal, faulted the command strategy thusly:
"Counterinsurgency theory prescribes providing continuous
security to the population.
However, for most of the war
American forces in Iraq have been concentrated on large forwardoperating bases, isolated from the Iraqi people and focused on
Overtasked Military, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 5, 2004, at C1 (explaining that Secretary
Rumsfeld supported only a temporary army expansion, and resisted the
congressional call for 40,000 more permanent army troops because, in his view, a
"transformed" military need not get bigger).
139 When the Clinton administration made its single largest ground
commitment abroad to Bosnia after the Dayton Accords, Congress capped the
troop level at 20,000. Halliburton support services let the army stretch to handle
the commitment while President Clinton adhered to that formal cap measuring
only the number of regular troops sent, the formal cap by which the American
public judged the occupation's scale. See J.T. Mlinarcik, Note, Private Military
Contractors & Justice: A Look at the Industry, Blackwater, & The Fallujah Incident, 4
REGENT J. INT'L L. 129, 132 (2006) (commenting on the defense contracting industry,
claims that can be made against contractors, and their potential defenses); SINGER,
supra note 24, at 143 (outlining the history of Halliburton's military outsourcing
contracts from Somalia through the Balkan conflicts).
140 Since these commitments all received limited public enthusiasm, the first
Bush and Clinton administrations used Halliburton to manage and contain the
apparent scale of these commitments. See SINGER, supra note 24, at 142-43
(providing an overview of Halliburton's logistical support role in these conflicts).
141 Thomas E. Ricks, Army Officer Accuses Generals of 'Intellectual and Moral
Failures,' WASH. PosT, Apr. 27, 2007, at A4.
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capturing or killing insurgents." 142 Outside critics had often made
this claim, drawing on American military sources, but the message
had exceptional impact coming from a named active-duty
lieutenant colonel. A number of factors led to the flawed "big
base" strategy, but, a pertinent one was the observed reluctance of
the "fifth service" - Halliburton, the logistics supplier -to stretch
its supply missions beyond the big bases, out to units in the field.
In fact, soldiers and officers bitterly complained about how they
did without the barest necessities while Halliburton devoted its
1 43
supply efforts to satisfying the high command at the big bases.
In that regard, Halliburton's limitations acted as a kind of short
leash on the military, keeping troops close to their big bases-and
feeding a much-criticized strategy poorly adapted either to
counterinsurgency or, for that matter, to countering the growth of
destabilizing sectarian militias.
Outsourcing the Iraq logistics to Halliburton had a parallel in
outsourcing the task to private security firms, of protecting Iraq
installations and reconstruction efforts.
By 2007, about 1000
contractors had been killed and another 13,000 wounded; a
notorious private military firm frankly termed "a mercenary" had
a $293 million contract to provide intelligence services. 144 In fact,
the roles of military support and reconstruction apparently
overlapped expensively: Halliburton became a middleman by
purchasing security services from subcontractors, sometimes even
via a multiple-tier deal, with costly markups accumulated at each
45
tier.1
142 Lt. Col. Paul Yingling, General Failure: America's Military Leadership Is in
Crisis, ARMED FORCES J., May 2007, at 16, 22.
143 See RASOR & BAUMANN, supra note 1, at 51-53 (contrasting frontline troops'
relative deprivation with the fully supplied luxuries of bases housing top officers).
144 Steve Fainaru & Alec Klein, In Iraq, A Private Realm of IntelligenceGathering: Firm Extends U.S. Government's Reach, WASH. POST, July 1, 2007, at Al.
The reliance on contractors "reduces the figure of 'official' casualties." Jeremy
Schill, A Very PrivateWar, THE GUARDIAN, Aug. 1 2007, at 4; see also Steve Fainaru,
Iraq Contractors Face Growing Parallel War: As Security Work Increases, So Do
Casualties, WASH. POST, June 16, 2007, at Al (explaining the underestimation of
casualty rates).
145 This meant DOD paid Halliburton a highly inflated price to purchase
services, often of its own veterans. These payments might well have provided far
more integrated services at far less cost, even paying veterans generous bonuses,
had the individuals providing the services been re-enlisted in some flexible way
and all the Halliburton middlemen been cut out.
For example, Blackwater USA was the big security contractor involved in the
incident that set off the first battle of Fallujah in April 2004. Mlinarcik, supra note
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The high expenses of private security ate up a large share of
amounts nominally expended for purposes such as reconstruction.
In that sense, the outsourcing to private security provided another
temporary fig leaf for unilateral intervention. 146 But, what the fig
leaf covered was not, even temporarily, a successful effort,
particularly in the oil industry. 147 Private security was no real
substitute for obtaining international and local support.
3.

THE FAILURE OF UNILATERALLY PROCURED
RECONSTRUCTION

3.1. The Woeful Start, and Failure,of UnilateralReconstruction
During the George H. W. Bush and Clinton administrations,
the United States had enjoyed relative post-Cold War success as a
world leader with an approach that used collective and
multilateral efforts as a way of looking after national interests. 48
These multilateral efforts included what could be called
procurement-related
multilateralism, which simply means
collective and multilateral roles in financing and supplying
military campaigns, occupations, and reconstruction efforts. 49
139, at 136. Blackwater was allegedly a third-tier subcontractor to Halliburton
under the LOGCAP contract. See DOLLARS, NOT SENSE, supra note 4, at 15 (giving
examples of middleman contracts in Iraq).
14 The United States, through the purchases of private security, bought
help-from its own veterans or veterans of foreign forces-while neither
acknowledging an escalated American commitment nor multilaterally organizing
help from foreign forces.
147 A classic example is the failure to provide sufficient security for the vital
oil industry to develop, as the 2006 Iraq Study Group sadly noted. The Study
Group noted the continuing low production "caused by lack of security, lack of
investment, and lack of technical capacity," IRAQ STUDY GROUP REPORT, supra note
10, at 22. Besides public security efforts, it suggested that "[p]rotective measures
could include a program to improve pipeline security by paying local tribes solely
on the basis of throughput (rather than fixed amounts)." Id. at 56.
148The senior President Bush brilliantly organized a United Nationssanctioned, truly inclusive coalition behind the Gulf War in 1990-1991. Similarly,
the Clinton administration ably organized a NATO-backed, truly inclusive
coalition behind the Bosnia occupation in 1995 and the Kosovo bombing
campaign in 1999.
149 For example, in 1990-1991, President Bush and the Democratic Congress
worked together to obtain multilateral funding for the Gulf War and to spend it
accountably. See TIEFER, supra note 36, at 119-36 (discussing the authorization of
the Persian Gulf War). In Bosnia, the reconstruction effort involved multilateral
donors and multilateral contractors. For all its flaws, it kept faith with other
countries and with locals, and it thereby helped produce success.
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The Bush administration came in with its trademark overall
approach of vocal unilateralism. As the Author has discussed
elsewhere, while this had its most visible signs in trashing the
United Nations and otherwise playing to the administration's mass
political base, it had its less visible signs in playing to the
administration's corporate base. 150
Of relevance, the Bush
administration implemented a fierce antipathy to what it scorned
as "nation-building," as Secretary Rumsfeld himself expressed on
the eve of the Iraq invasion in his prominent speech entitled
"Beyond Nation-Building." 15 '
In practice, this meant Deputy
Secretary Paul Wolfowitz and Under Secretary Douglas Feith
undertook the opposite of the serious compromises required to
gain the support of the European and world community's
collective institutions; these serious compromises would have
sufficiently provided for most of the procurement and some part of
152
the reconstruction financing to be done on a multilateral basis.
Instead, on the crucial points of reconstruction contracting and
setting up the new Iraq, the United States would only pay large,
administration-loyal American contractors rather than small
contractors, foreign contractors, or Iraqi locals.
This meant a series of key steps in the year before the invasion.
The White House, while spurning the State Department planning
15 4
effort, 153 instead apparently directed by Vice President Cheney,

150 For
example, the administration systematically watered down
international tobacco-control efforts, rewarding its key support from Big Tobacco,
and it undermined international efforts at a new bioweapons protocol, pleasing its
drug industry support. See, e.g., Tiefer, supra note 39, at 166-68 (describing a
watered-down international tobacco agreement), at 171 (discussing bioweapons
protocol).
151 GORDON & TRATNOR, supra note 1, at 151.
152 See Gilman, supra note 27 (discussing the Bush administration's effect on
the possibility of multilateral efforts).
153 In a hopeful but doomed effort, the State Department convened a "Future
of Iraq Project" in April 2002. This project, together with the State Department's
experience in Bosnia and elsewhere with successful occupation, meant that the
department might have guided an occupation on terms relatively acceptable to
the international and local Iraqi communities. Under this umbrella, 240 Iraqi
exiles convened, and after extensive negotiations across ethnic and ideological
lines, produced thirteen volumes of recommendations. See James Fallows, Blind
into Baghdad,THE ATLANTIC, Jan.-Feb. 2004, at 51, 56.
154 Tom Warrick, the highly regarded head of the project, and clearly the
government's leader on how to handle an occupation of Iraq, was pulled
completely off the Pentagon's occupation team; "the order had come from
Cheney, who despised Warrick." PACKER, supra note 1, at 124.
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turned over control of the occupation planning, and the occupation
itself, to the Rumsfeld Department. The administration had to give
up any chance of even a tinge of multilateral support in a United
Nations Security Council vote. A White House meeting put
together an offer for Turkish support, to be obtained for a package
including procurement that would be handled, unlike the Bosnia
occupation, completely without multilateral support.
Turkey
55
rejected the offer. 1
In January 2003, President Bush issued the secret legal
instrument shaped by Vice President Cheney that turned
occupation planning over to the "Office of Special Plans," the name
given for Iraqi affairs, headed by Under Secretary Feith.156 That
office fastened Halliburton onto the occupation reconstruction. 157

155 As

Cobra II recounts:

[a]n October meeting chaired by Condoleezza Rice had settled on a
package of $3 billion in aid, $3 billion in financing, and a promise to
make a concentrated effort to persuade Persian Gulf states to provide $1
billion in free oil and to help Turkish companies secure reconstruction
contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan.
GORDON & TRAINOR, supra note 1, at 343 (emphasis added). The package was
effectively rejected only when the Turkish legislature, in line with Turkish public
opinion, refused to cooperate with an invasion that had no collection sanction.
156 Secretary Rumsfeld let the Office of Special Plans be staffed and guided by
Richard Perle, the highly influential head of the Defense Policy Board, who united
there the self-interest of the defense contractors with the unilateralist ideology.
See PACKER, supra note 1, at 28-38, 105-06 (discussing the pre-2001 background of
Perle and neoconservatives as to Iraq and introducing Perle's prot~g~s and the
Office of Special Plans). As Packer comments: "all roads from Special Plans led
back to Perle." Id. at 106. The unit within the Pentagon that would administer
Iraq immediately after the fall of the regime was called the Office of
Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance ("ORHA").
See id. at 120
(discussing the creation of the ORHA). National Security Presidential Directive
No. 24, drafted at the Office of Special Plans, gave control over postwar Iraq to the
Department of Defense.
157 Once Vice President Cheney had empowered and anointed Under
Secretary Feith, Feith installed his former law partner, Michael Mobbs, as head of
ORHA's civil administration team. "Mobbs, a political appointee, made the
decision to award Halliburton, Cheney's old company, a secret, seven-billiondollar, no-bid contract to restore Iraqi oil fields after clearing it with Cheney's
chief of staff, Scooter Libby." Id. at 123. The methods involved in awarding
Halliburton the contract, and writing terms so favorable to the company, outraged
the responsible contracting officer. When the contract was awarded, Bunnatine
Greenhouse, the most senior contracting officer in the entire U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, in "a final act of defiance decided to write her objections directly onto
the contract" -which only came out publicly in 2006. MILLER, supra note 3, at 86.
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Apart from awarding Halliburton that contract, the Office of
158
Special Plans failed to plan for occupation.
Also, over $2 billion in reconstruction contracts was awarded,
technically by the Agency for International Development
("AID"). 5 9 When AID announced the process, a media firestorm
ensued. An uncommonly large number of print and broadcast
outlets interviewed the Author, including an appearance as a live
guest on the Lehrer News Hour.160 Following White House
instructions, AID only allowed bidding by a couple of
administration-loyal invitees for each of the dozen or so contracts.
Most extraordinarily, this excluded any bidding whatsoever from
abroad, even though the contracts would be performed abroad.
This was unilateral procurement with a vengeance.' 61
As a matter of procurement law, the White House tried to keep
its fingerprints off this contracting, saying it was all done by AID,
which had more respect in such matters than the Rumsfeld
Department. 62 On this key point, the Author was quoted in the
Washington Post and pressed at a House hearing:163 President Bush
158 For
example, Mobbs, ostensibly head of civil administration,
"immediately afterward flew to Iraqi Kurdistan .. . essentially abandoning his
duties before he ever assumed them. In the end, civil administration would turn
out to be the pillar that mattered most." PACKER, supra note 1, at 123.
159 See Scott P. Fitzsimmons, First Round of Iraq Reconstruction Contracts
Provide Insight Into Agency Authority, Misunderstood Procurement Techniques, 56
ADMIN. L. REV. 219 (2004) (discussing the procedure used to award contracts);
Jackie Spinner, USAID to Review Selection Process for Iraq Contracts, WASH. POST,
Apr. 25, 2003, at A12 (reporting on White House proposals for $2.4 billion in
reconstruction contracts, contracts to be awarded by AID).
160 Transcript of The New Iraq, ONLINE NEwsHouR, Apr. 30, 2003, available at
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle east/jan-june03/iraq-4-30.html.
161 Even well-qualified bids from America's fighting allies, the British, were
refused. Since Iraq had been a British protectorate before independence, the
excluded British companies sometimes, such as in the case of shipping lines, had
long, actual experience with Iraq which the American bidders did not. See David
Teather, Jobsfor the Boys: The Reconstruction Billions, THE GUARDIAN, Apr. 15, 2003,
at 6 (discussing contracts awarded to American companies).
162 Among other matters, the head of AID, Andrew Natsios, rightly enjoyed
respect as an effective long-term manager of difficult international procurements.
See generally Biography of Andrew S. Natsios, http://www.usaid.gov/
about-usaid/bios/bio-asn.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2007).
163 Subsequently, when the Author testified at a House committee hearing
about procurement, the chair of the committee that oversees contracting irately,
but inaccurately, insisted that the Author had been wrong. The Author was
testifying about the Revised Services Acquisition Reform Act. See Better Training,
Efficiency and Accountability: Services Acquisition Reform for the 21st Century: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on Gov't Reform, 108th Cong. 176-77 (2003) (statement of
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had a personal role necessitated by a specific aspect of the
procurement.164
In February
2003, when
Rumsfeld
delivered
his
aforementioned speech "Beyond Nation-Building," he scorned the
Clinton administration handling of the former Yugoslavia, where
peace-keeping and reconstruction had led, he said, to a "culture of
dependency." Wolfowitz publicly announced that because Iraq
was rich in oil, it could handle reconstruction without such
lengthy, costly, sustained American help. 165 The author, asked
about this on the Lehrer News Hour,166 expressed disbelief, stating it
would take a great many years for substantial Iraqi oil funding for
reconstruction.
There are two other points that warrant noting. On the eve of
the looting of government offices that so undermined the
occupation, 167 the White House rejected the proposals by career
officials to send five thousand law enforcement personnel. Instead,
the administration began planning on a contracted-for training
mission that might start up six months into the operation. 68 In
other words, the White House followed the creed of acquisition
169
reform, and outsourced the support for law enforcement.
Charles Tiefer, Professor of Law, University of Baltimore) (discussing
procurement safeguards). This was not one of the usual matters that Vice
President Cheney could manage through Secretary Rumsfeld. President Bush's
own personal signature had been needed. The President's role had been stated in
a White House announcement when the contract was awarded. All the Author
did is explain why, namely, that Bechtel had insisted on indemnification. Since
AID, in the State Department, is not one of the agencies with a standing
delegation of authority to indemnify, the President had to do it himself.
164 See Karen DeYoung & Jackie Spinner, Contract for Rebuilding of Iraq
Awarded to Bechtel, WASH. POST, Apr. 18, 2003, at A23 (outlining the effects
indemnification had on the contract).
165 See RICKS, supra note 1, at 98 (recording Wolfowitz's statements about
Iraq's ability to fund its own reconstruction).
166 The New Iraq, supra note 160.
167 Secretary Rumsfeld's invading force did not have the planning, the orders,
or the manpower to control it. Specifically, the combination of military
transformation and procurement unilateralism meant that the limited American
forces did not include military police or other "garrison"-type forces, and our
forces were not supplemented in these regards with other nations' help as in
Bosnia. See generally PACKER, supra note 1, at 135-44 (noting the problems in the
background of the looting).
168 See GORDON & TRAINOR, supra note 1, at 467 (discussing the possible
training mission).
169 The looting made Iraqis doubt that the conquering Americans truly
intended a meaningful transition, for as bad as Saddam Hussein had been, Iraqis

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

U. Pa. J. In t'l L.

[Vol. 29:1

After reluctantly letting go of the dream of being able to
withdraw without a real occupation, 170 the administration set up
the Coalition Provisional Authority ("CPA") to administer Iraq
under Ambassador L. Paul Bremer. 171 In June 2004, the effort
received the minimal multilateral legitimation of Security Council
Resolution 1546. This slow activity put heavy responsibility on the
United States' reconstruction effort. 172 Soon Deputy Secretary
Wolfowitz's convenient pre-invasion vision of reconstruction selffunded by Iraqi oil ended. 73 So, the Iraqi population blamed the
sluggishness of reconstruction on the American occupation.
What made the American responsibility worse was the CPA's
handling of the other main source, besides American
appropriations, of reconstruction funding. Pursuant to Security

abhorred this violent, seemingly destructive chaos visited upon them from the
new occupiers. Moreover, the estimate of the damage from the looting was a
staggering $12 billion, equal to the gross national product of Iraq. This was more
than four times what the Bush administration provided initially in American
reconstruction contracting funds. See generally PACKER, supra note 1, at 139
(describing the background and impact of the $12 billion in looting); Gideon Rose,
Self-inflicted?: How Careless U.S. Leaders Botched Efforts In Iraq, Hous. CHRON., Oct.
30, 2005, at 18 (noting the broad impact of the $12 billion in looting).
170 That month of April was the very short period when retired Gen. Jay
Garner ran or purported to run a short-term, low-impact version of Iraq
occupation. Garner was supposed to revive and maintain an Iraq administration
and its services, notably police but also military, expected to be relatively intact.
See generally PACKER, supra note 1, at 130-44 (noting Garner's presence in Kuwait
and Iraq in April).
171 See DIAMOND, supra note 1, at 76 (describing the intertwined military and
civilian staff of the CPA).
172 As noted, even before the invasion, the administration had let about $2
billion in major reconstruction contracts, with highly restricted competition
favoring Halliburton, Bechtel, and so on, without opportunities for other nations,
even for our ally Britain. Halliburton was in charge of reconstructing the oil
industry and also of filling Iraq's own needs for petroleum products, Bechtel of
reconstructing Iraq's electric infrastructure, and so on.
Since this initial
contracting provided little successful near or even medium-term reconstruction, it
implicated the big American contractors in the later "reconstruction gap." See
generally Charles J. Hanley, Much of Iraq Still in Ruin: As U.S. Builders Leave; Local
Officials Will Be Faced With Running Plants and Finishing Jobs Left by Big Companies,
Hous. CHRON., Oct. 15, 2006, at 30 (showing Halliburton and Bechtel as part of the
reconstruction gap).
173 The administration had grossly underestimated the poor condition of the
infrastructure after years of U.N. sanctions mishandled by Saddam's regime and
exacerbated by looting. Meanwhile, the establishment of the CPA with Bremer in
charge meant that the United States took full responsibility in 2003-2004, with
minimal power-sharing with the Iraqi ministries or other Iraqi figures. MILLER,
supra note 3, at 36-38; RICKs, supra note 1, at 213.
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Council sanction resolutions, the receipts for selling Iraqi oil went
into the DFI. 74 The CPA took control of the expenditure of DFI
funds.
Apparently the CPA's contracting procedures were
looser-very loose-about funding from DFI, treating it as a slush
fund.175 Subsequently, a United Nations arm, the International
Advisory and Monitoring Board, protested to the United States
concerning adverse audit findings about Halliburton payments.
Specifically, it recommended Halliburton pay back several
hundred million dollars in DFI funds. 176 In effect, international
distrust of the United States hardened as Iraqi money-not
American appropriations -was spent with laxity on procurements
benefiting the occupation's own politically favored companies.
This worsened the expected foreign and Iraqi tendency to view
America as deserving the fate of a unilateral effort. 177 The transfer

See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
175 See MILLER, supra note 3, at 188 ("Coalition Provisional Authority
Memorandum No. 4 set out contracting guidelines that ran for 31 pages, as
opposed to the 1,923 page U.S. regulation,. Proposals could be posted and
awarded in a single day. Contracts did not have to be competitively bid. Protests
were limited."). Since the Defense Department dominated CPA contracting, this
amounted to a continuation of Rumsfeld's procurement-aided unilateralism, as
his officials could, and apparently did, spend billions outside the rules, treating an
Iraqi fund with which they have been multilaterally entrusted as a slush fund, in a
way sure to alienate international support.
174

The guidelines, in short, turned the Iraqi funds into easy money, and the
coalition wasted no time spending it ....
The Development Fund also
came to be a petty cash drawer for the CPA .... But it didn't matter: it
was Iraqi money, not U.S. funds.
Id. at 188-89.
176 See Iraq Reconstruction: IAMB Calls on U.S. to pay Iraqi Government up to
$208M in 'Questioned' KBR Charges, 84 FED. CoNT. REP. 473 (2005) (discussing
IAMB scrutiny of an audit by the Special Inspector General for Iraq
Reconstruction, which noted "questioned" expenditures of $208 million involving
a no-bid contract awarded to KBR, and IAMB's recommendation that the United
States repay this amount to the Iraqi government). For an explanation of DFI
funds, see supra text accompanying note 32.
177 The contemporary revelations about foreign leaders' complicity in the
"Oil-for-Food" scandal about the pre-invasion oil funds allowed administration
supporters in the Congress to point the fingers of blame right back, but the
exchanges did little to mend relations or assuage the Iraqis about American
abuses. See, e.g., John R. Crook, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating
to International Law: International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, 99 AM. J.
INT'L L. 479, 495 (2005) (discussing audits of the Oil-for-Food program released by
the U.N. and the resulting probes of the program by Congress); John R. Crook,
Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law: General
Internationaland U.S. Foreign Relations Law, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 691,704 (2005) (same).
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by the CPA of approximately $8.8 billion in DFI funds to Iraqi
ministries occurred, according to the Special Inspector General,
without "sufficient managerial, financial, and contractual controls
to ensure DFI funds were used in a transparent manner.
Consequently, there was no assurance that funds were used for the
purposes mandated by the United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1483."'17

President Bush began to acknowledge how far off the mark the
pre-invasion optimism had been. However, he held back the initial
request to Congress for the additional reconstruction funding until
later in 2003,179 putting a request for what became the $18.4 billion
Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Funds ("IRRF") into the (effectively
off-the-budget) war supplemental appropriation. That, in itself,
meant at least half a year of crucial delay, just in terms of time
before funding was even initially authorized. 180 The Iraqis lost
patience with the lack of immediate tangible improvements. So the
sluggish reconstruction contracting in 2003-2004 fed the sense,
played upon by both the armed Iraqi militias and the insurgents,
that the occupation was the enemy.' 8 '
178 United States' Involvement in Iraq Reconstruction: Hearing Before the H.
Oversight and Gov't Reform Comm., 110th Cong. 6 (2007) (statement of Stuart W.
Bowen, Jr., Spec. Inspector Gen. for Iraq Reconstruction), available at
http://www.sigir.mil/reports/pdf/testimony/SIGIRTestimony-07-003T.pdf.
179 As part of the general refusal to submit to regular budget oversight
discipline, he did not ask the Congress for even a part of the new reconstruction
funding during the regular budget cycle. See generally Richard W. Stevenson,
White House Memo; Delaying Talk About the Cost of War, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2003,
at 24 (noting early in the year the significance of Iraq funding outside the regular
budget cycle).
180 The growing realization of the abuses in the earlier reconstruction
funding, coupled with this being appropriated (not DFI) funding, meant a further
delay from regular procedures for awarding contracts, as well as additional
delays often before task orders occurred and then further delays before
performing them. See generally Jonathan Weisman & Ariana Eunjung Cha,
Rebuilding Aid Unspent, Tapped to Pay Expenses, WASH. PosT, Apr. 30, 2004, at Al
(surveying factors in delay of reconstruction contract awards).
181 For example, the summer of 2003 was very hot in Baghdad, and with the
power supply in such poor shape, people suffered. They craved the near-term
improvements denied them by the slow American activity, without taking much
solace in dubious assurances that reconstruction along fully planned lines would
accomplish more in the long term. To the extent that the United States was
perceived to have taken all the power and funding away from Iraqi officials,
aggrieved Iraqis did not have the avenue of working through their own
authorities or even the outlet of venting their disgruntlement that way. See
Patrick Cannon, The Ruse of Reconstruction, Z MAGAZINE ONLINE (Sept. 2004),
available at http://zmagsite.zmag.org/Sept2004/cannon0904.htm (examining the
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3.2. From 2007 on: The Reconstruction Gap
When Congress provided $18 billion in IRRF for reconstruction
contracting in late 2003, added to prior appropriations and to Iraqi
funding, it expected this to advance the goals of restoring the Iraqi
economy and society and bringing tangible improvements in the
quality of life for Iraqis. By 2007, the administration obligated and
largely expended the $18 billion and turned the reconstruction task
over to the Iraqi government, yet the reality of reconstruction
contracting had fallen into what the Special Inspector General for
Iraq Reconstruction bluntly described as the "reconstruction
gap." 18 2 Of course, the insurgency's attacks produced part of that
shortfall, destroying part of the work and imposing heavy
spending on security. But the reconstruction gap also reflected
failures in procurement policy and law, epitomized by the failures
as to Iraqi oil and gas' s3 despite Iraq's having the world's secondlargest oil reserves. 184
Contracting with Halliburton and other contractors to repair
and upgrade the industry's facilities turned out not to provide all
that much value for the billions paid out. One major contracting
episode at the key Tigris crossing, uncovered by the New York
Times in 2006, illustrated a problem as much with procurement as
with security. 8 5 In August 2003, Halliburton received a key

U.S. control of Iraqi economic redevelopment and rebuilding despite the
"handover" of control to the Iraqi government).
182 Review of Iraq Reconstruction: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Int'l Relations.,
109th Cong. 2 (2006) (statement of Stuart W. Bowen, Jr., Spec. Inspector Gen. for
Iraq Reconstruction).
183 See id. at 3 ("[B]efore the war, three assumptions were made about the oil
and gas sector in Iraq: that oil and gas revenues in post-war Iraq would pay for
much of the reconstruction, that foreign private investment in the oil and gas
sector would quickly flow into Iraq, after the fall of the Saddam regime that postwar Iraq would be sufficiently secure to allow the development of oil and gas
without hostile impediment. To varying degrees, each of these assumptions has
proved to be incorrect.").
184 This was both by the actual lack of Iraqi production, and, also, by the
geopolitical risk that added a hefty premium to Middle East oil pricing. In fact,
the negative impact amounted to a sizable component of the $2 trillion price tag
for the Iraq conflict calculated by Professors Stiglitz and Bilmes. See Bilmes &
Stiglitz, supra note 51, at 30 (estimating the costs of the Iraq war in both direct and
macroeconomic costs).
185 See James Glanz, Rebuilding of Iraqi Oil Pipeline As Disaster Waiting to
Happen, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2006, at Al (covering Halliburton's contract to replace
the crucial bridge crossing for pipelines at the Tigris River, which "had been the
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geotechnical report alerting against an underground plan because
of unstable terrain. But Halliburton did not back off the nowdoomed plan, nor did it even share the alarming information with
the government. In 2004, it went ahead with underground drilling,
wasting the entire $220 million allocated for the job, as well as very
precious months. As of that Times report in August 2006, oil was
still not flowing. 186 Halliburton did not suffer the legal penalties
for contractor misconduct. It was paid the entire $220 million
allocated. 187 The lack of government oversight and credible
188
penalties sacrificed precious years without progress.
It was an endemic problem that the government did not use its
strong legal tools for dealing with contractors, such as threatening
termination for default or other penalties. In a step which drew
widespread attention, the Special Inspector General terminated
various construction jobs run by Parsons Corp., due to delays in
completion. 189 Business Week cited this as one of "legion" instances
"of military outsourcing gone bad in Iraq." 190 But again, this
involved only a gentle separation, not termination for default.
Looked at generally, the administration's contracting methods
ill suited the need to counter the isolation of its unilateral effort
from international and Iraqi support. To award the $18.4 billion in
contracts, the administration set up a shop eventually named the
Project and Contracting Office, headed by David Nash, a retired

main link between Iraq's rich northern oil fields and the export terminals and
refineries").
186 The government did not get the facts until a year after the report, in July
2007, whereupon it changed to a different approach and brought to bear new
funding. Id.
187 See id. ("[Halliburton] received a slap on the wrist when it got only about 4
percent of its potential bonus fees on the job order.., there was no other financial
penalty.").
188 The contractor took abusive advantage of the contract's pricing as costbased, rather than fixed-price, to pocket a huge amount, whereas, on a fixed-price
contract, a contractor which spent so much without results would potentially have
faced a huge loss.
Close enough government scrutiny would have put
Halliburton executives to the choice of turning their cards face up early enough to
avoid the fiasco, or participating in a culpable conspiracy to defraud. See id.
189 See Mary Buckner Powers, Big Changes Loom in Iraq for Reconstruction
Forces, ENGINEERING NEws-RECORD, July 24, 2006, at 13 (reviewing the termination
of several projects run by Parsons Corp. by the Special Inspector General for
failing to meet completion dates).
190 Kopecki, supra note 14, at 54. Frank Camm, the defense contracting expert
at Rand Corp., traced the problem to the Pentagon's reduced numbers of
contracting officials, as some contractors "exploited the new freedom." Id. at 55.
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rear admiral. As laid out by T. Christian Miller in his insightful
book on contracting in Iraq, Nash ruled out "contracting directly
with their Iraqi counterparts." 191 So, the contracting policy and law
structured the work as mega-projects, like a single project of
reconstructing the entire electrical system. Such mega-projects
went to multinational engineering companies, such as Bechtel or
Parsons, singly or in consortia, without close government
direction, as "design-build." 192 Relatively few of the contracts went
to small, foreign, or local Iraqi companies, and even much of the
employment for individuals went to Americans or other
expatriates rather than to qualified Iraqis. Resort to design-build
let giant American companies hog the payments, often with
limited results to show. Moreover, as with Halliburton, the
administration eschewed the recognized penalty tools of
procurement law for breach, strove to mute the discussion of
American contractor failure, and left untreated the system's vices,
like the severe shortage of acquisition supervisors. 193
In a classic example, a joint venture of big American companies
191 MILLER, supra note 3, at 115-16 (reviewing Nash's early decision making in
his Iraq rebuilding plan). Nash had risen in the navy to the head of its
construction engineering corps, and then took posts in private engineering firms
that wanted government work. Nash "believed that large, multi-national
corporations should do the work." Id. at 115.
192 Specifically, the administration set the contracts up legally as large-scale
"design-build," meaning that the consortia bidding on these must demonstrate in
their proposals the entire range of advanced engineering design and construction.
In the construction world, including federal government construction in the past
decade, design-build is well-accepted and often represents a sound contractual
solution to naturally enormous projects. See, e.g., Frank J. Baltz & J. Russell
Morrissey, "Bargaining" in Federal Construction Contracting, THE PROCUREMENT
LAWYER, Spring 1998, at 16 (defining the shift from the "design-bid-build" method
to the "design/build" method of government contracting); Robert S. Brams, et al.,
Best Value in Federal Construction Contracting, THE CONSTRUCTION LAWYER, April
1999, at 25 (examining the process of "design-build" bidding for government
contracts).
193 See Dickinson, supra note 16, at 205 (noting the nearly fifty percent
reduction in the Defense Department's acquisition workforce between 1990 and
2001); David A. Whiteford, Negotiated Procurements: Squandering the Benefit of the
Bargain, 32 PuB. CONT. L.J. 509, 555-57 (2003) (discussing the downsizing of the
Defense Department's acquisition workforce and the resulting problems from the
reduction). The advantaging of big American contractors over small or Iraqi
business persisted. See Corps of Engineers Chief Calls Iraq Rebuild "On-Plan,"
ENGINEERING NEwS-RECORD, July 18, 2005, at 13 (stating that in July 2005, only 20%
of spending on current construction contracts went to Iraqi local firms). Yet even
this had American firms grumbling at it being "turned into a public works
employment program." Debra K. Rubin et al., Iraq Managers Assess Future,
ENGINEERING NEWS-RECORD, Feb. 7, 2005, at 10.
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based near the Pentagon got a prime contract early in 2004 to
oversee design of the entire Iraqi transportation sector, including
roadways, airports, and bridges. 194 During that whole crucial year,
the joint venture failed to start actually building anything. The
government program manager, Professor Charles W. Keller,
denounced this, explaining that the joint venture "never started a
project" but was "a blocker to getting anything done." 195 He
criticized turning the whole work over to American rather than
Iraqi firms, for "[tjhe Iraqis don't have the same overhead as U.S.
design-build firms do."196 When asked why the administration
only belatedly made public the details of the failed contract,
Professor Keller replied, "When you have a bad apple in your
family, do you stand up and announce it?" 197 In August 2006 the
Special Inspector General declared it a disaster to rely upon a
"strategy for acquisition management, which used a design-build
approach giving contractors oversight over infrastructure
98

sectors."1

By 2007, the United States was failing in its attempt to mitigate
the reconstruction gap by a transfer of projects to the Iraq
government. The Special Inspector General found that the Iraqi
central government refused to take possession of 2,300 completed
reconstruction projects. This often meant the projects got turned
over to local authorities that might not be able to adequately fund
or maintain them, notwithstanding the critical nature of the
projects, such as power stations servicing Baghdad. 199 In turn, this
194 Note that the work did not require lumping as one giant design-build
project; rather, the administration's strategists liked to delegate the whole sector
to one overall private contracting venture. See PCO Sends Contrack Team Home
from the Front in Iraq, ENGINEERING NEwS-RECORD, Jan. 10, 2005, at 19 (accounting
for the relationship between cost accumulation and construction starts).
195 Id. Keller was actually a professor and recognized expert who came to his
stint in Baghdad, and returned there afterwards, from his post as Assistant
Professor of Engineering Management at the University of Kansas. See id.; see also
MILLER, supra note 3, at 193-94 (providing further background on Keller and his
criticisms of the CPA's squandering of funds).
196 PCO Sends Contrack Team Homefrom the Front in Iraq, supra note 194, at 19.
197

Id.

Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons Learned In ContractingAnd Procurement:Hearing
Before the S. Comm. On Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs., 109th Cong. 44
(Aug. 2, 2006) (statement of Stuart W. Bowen, Jr., Spec. Inspector Gen. for Iraq
Reconstruction).
199 See Leslie Hoffecker, Iraq Fails to Take Over U.S. Projects, L.A. TIMES, July 30,
2007, at A4 (covering the Iraqi central government's refusal to take responsibility
for over 2,300 completed reconstruction projects); Gordon Lubold, Troubled
198
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raised the possibility that the Shiite-dominated central government
did not want to sustain projects for the benefit of Sunni
communities, making American procurement a pawn in sectarian
conflict.
The alienation of international support by administration
unilateralism during the countdown to invasion meant the absence
of foreign private investment thereafter. Before the invasion,
Russia, Germany, and France had taken part in Iraq trade or in the
Iraq oil industry, and could have provided precious direct private
investment, continuation of past work, and crucial spare parts;
Washington never had a role for them during the occupation.
With great fanfare, in 2003 the administration convened a
conference of countries in Madrid to forgive Iraq's debts and to
pledge grants or loans for Iraqi projects, particularly relating to
water and electricity. 200 By 2005, of over $13 billion in (non-U.S.)
aid pledged (including both grants and loans), less than $4 billion,
or only 30 percent 20 1 of funds, had been actually forthcoming.
Even a donor punctilious about fulfilling pledges, Japan,
suspended its loans in 2006.202
When representatives of donor nations met in Jordan in 2005 to
discuss the rebuilding efforts in Iraq, officials from Canada, Japan,
Iraq, and other countries criticized the American efforts. 20 3 Barham
Salih, Iraq's minister of planning and development cooperation,
stated that reconstruction by American contractors had proceeded
"very, very, very slowly so far,"' and that the Iraqi government
would do a better job.20 4 Not all nations agreed with this sentiment
however. When another such conference occurred in Egypt in May
2007, alienated Sunni neighbors like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait
stated that they remained "frustrated with [Iraqi Prime Minister]
Handover for US-Iraq Projects, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 30, 2007, at 2
(discussing the apportionment of blame for troubled reconstruction projects and
the necessity of the Iraqi government to take control of some projects).
200 See Reina, supra note 26, at 611 (noting the interest of the international
community in cooperation to rebuild postwar Iraq as demonstrated at the Madrid
Conference).
201 Doug Smith & Borzou Daraghi, 'Marshall Plan'.for Iraq Fades, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 15, 2006, at Al.
202 Reiji Yoshida, Iraq to Get First Reconstruction Loans, JAPAN TIMES, Mar. 29,
2006.
203 See James Glanz, Iraqis Press Donors for Billions More in Reconstruction Aid,
N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2005, at A6; T. Christian Miller, U.S. Criticized on Iraq
Rebuilding, L.A. TIMES, July 19, 2005, at A5.
204 Miller, supra note 203, at A5 (quoting Barham Salih).
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Maliki's failure to deal with Sunni concerns," 205 and it did not look
like funding would roll in to make up for the contractor
reconstruction gap.
4.

THE FAILURE OF THE RESORT TO UNACCOUNTABLE
FUNDING TO SUSTAIN UNILATERALISM

Closely tied to procurement is the method of funding the war.
A multilateral effort would have drawn from international
legitimacy and overseas allies both foreign financial support and
the capacity to elicit transparent funding from Congress and the
American taxpayer. In contrast, part of the paradigm to sustain a
unilateral war in Iraq consisted of funding it non-transparently, so
as to keep Congress and the taxpayer tractable. The following is
illustrative of that unaccountable funding.
4.1. The ProcuredExile (Chalabi) Government That Failed
Apparently, an inner administration plan in 2002-2003 sought
to turn over much of governance of Iraq to the well-known exile
Ahmed Chalabi. This represented the ultimate indicator of how far
the administration's procurement-aided unilateralism had gone. It
seemingly encompassed the outright purchase, as though of a
market commodity, of an unsupported government to be
illegitimately imposed upon the Iraqis.
This significant episode starts with Chalabi, a figure of
importance 206 before and after the invasion, well profiled in a 2004
article in the New Yorker.20 7 The Defense Department sustained
205 Michael Slackman & Helene Cooper, Concern Is High and Unity Hopes Are
Nil at Talks on Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2007, at A12.
206 In the 1990s, Chalabi demonstrated such unreliability and duplicity that
the CIA washed its hands of him and would deal with him no longer. Thereafter,
he cultivated relationships with conservative congressmen and neoconservative
figures, and looked for large-scale grant and contract funding through the State
Department and especially DOD.
Once the Bush administration took office, and particularly after 9/11, Chalabi
was the source of much fabricated intelligence about supposed weapons of mass
destruction. Under Secretary Feith and his superiors used this to shore up the
push for war despite the solidly grounded skepticism of State Department and
CIA analysts. This is to be treated in a forthcoming report from the Senate
Intelligence Committee.
207 See Jane Mayer, The Manipulator, NEw YORKER, June 7, 2004, at 58 (stating
that Chalabi was a fugitive from Jordan, convicted there of massive bank fraud;
was, as an Iraqi exile, the leader of an organization called the Iraqi National
Congress; and asserting that he sought to get the United States to overthrow
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Chalabi by a flow of American contracts and similar funding
vehicles. 20 8 Despite the CIA having pulled away, 20 9 the United
States still paid "Chalabi's organization substantial amounts,
totaling more than $36 million from 2000-2003."210
Two months before the invasion, DOD began pouring funds
into Chalabi's pocket by giving his group a formal status as the
Iraqi Reconstruction and Development Council ("IRDC").
Apparently DOD paid for them to be the nucleus of its Iraqi
advising-governing body during the expected occupation. DOD
did this funding by a contract with the Science Applications
International Corporation ("SAIC").211
DOD had planned that the contracted exiles, led by Chalabi,
would take the Iraqi dictatorship's suddenly-emptied top posts. 212
Soon after Bremer formed the new Iraqi Governing Council, DOD
placed Chalabi on it. Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz continued to

Saddam Hussein in ways that would advance him as an exile and, after a regime
change, install him as the next leader).
208 See PHILLIPS, supra note 3, at 72 ("The U.S. government funneled more than
$100 million to the Iraqi National Congress between 1992 and 2004 ....
Corruption was inevitable with so much money kicking around.").
209 Ordinarily, funding of an exile organization would occur through CIA
payments, and the CIA has its ways to obtain value even from dubious groups,
but as noted, the CIA had washed its hands of Chalabi-hence the other federal
funding vehicles. Chalabi's jealousy of alternative Iraqi exile figures led him,
acting through political allies, to hold back pre-invasion grants.
210 RICKS, supra note 1, at 57 (discussing how Chalabi attempted to influence
the United States government through information, the media, and political
connections, and how the government in turn was paying money to Chalabi's
organization).
211 SAIC is a very well-connected darling of the administration's "acquisition
reform" system. The lax practices of "acquisition reform" created a niche for
contractors such as SAIC to obtain contracts on easy terms from the government
and, in return, to serve such functions as being a conduit for the funding of exiles
without an actual prospect of support within Iraq.
As the public found after the invasion, Iran, too, had built up exile
organizations, but its groups turned out to have real support in the Iraqi
population; Chalabi had so little that when a real election finally occurred, his
party did not get enough votes even to seat a single leader - himself - in the new
legislature.
212 See DIAMOND, supra note 1, at 286 ("The United States could then hand the
country over to the pro-American exiles, led by Ahmed Chalabi, and get out
within a few months."). ORHA would not itself govern as an occupying regime,
just handle refugee problems, coordinate relations between the soon-withdrawing
U.S. military, other nations' forces, and the Iraqi civil authorities, and supervise
contractors: reconstruction contractors, training contractors for police and
military, and the rest of the contractors (e.g., Halliburton for the oil).
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funnel money to him by a very suspicious no-bid successor
contract to the one to SAIC, framed misleadingly as one for
ordinary translation and similar support services. A Washington
Post article, by using a GAO opinion, 213 opened a window into
DOD contracting with the successors to SAIC and Chalabi. As the
Author told the Post: "'Our Defense Department has continued to
pay, through pliant contractors, for a flock of Iraqi political exiles
214
as our paid political agents in Iraq."'
The IRDC members were officially employed by SAIC and held
Iraqi ministry positions during the occupation, making SAIC, with
its own contracting agenda, the paymaster of Iraqi officials of
dubious legitimacy. Subsequently, the DOD Inspector General
published a highly critical report regarding corruption in SAIC's
contracts related to the Iraqi media. 215 Meanwhile, SAIC was
becoming notorious as a fast-growing contractor that obtained
funds through revolving-door political connections. 216 Chalabi's
role reflected the improvident uses DOD could make of the
flexibility of radical "acquisition reform."217
4.2. Unaccountable $2 Trillion Price Tag
The Gulf War and the post-1995 Bosnia occupation occurred
213 See Worldwide Language Resources, Inc., File No. B-296984 U.S. Gov't
Accountability Office (Nov. 14, 2005) (upholding a protest against the award of an
air force department contract from commercial companies that wished to compete
to provide such services legitimately).
214 Renae Merle, Air Force Erred with No-Bid Iraq Contract, GAO Says, WASH.
POST, Nov. 29, 2005, at A17.
215 See Demetri Sevastopulo, US Military "Cut Corners" on Iraq Contracts, FIN.
TIMES, Mar. 26, 2004, at 8 (citing a Pentagon report that highlighted
"irregularities" in 24 contracts awarded by the Pentagon, totaling $122 million);
see also Bruce V. Bigelow, Report Rips SAIC Over Iraq Contracts, SAN DIEGO UNIONTRIB., Mar. 25, 2004, at C1 (citing the same Pentagon report noted above, but
particularly highlighting the report's critique of SAIC).
216 See The Center for Public Integrity: Windfalls of War, http://www
.publicintegrity.org/wow/bio.aspx?act=pro&ddlC=51 (last visited Oct. 18, 2007)
(providing a contractor profile for the SAIC, including a description of its
arrangement with the IRDC); see also Donald L. Barlett & James B. Steele,
Washington's $8 Billion Shadow, VANITY FAIR, Mar. 2007, at 324 (providing an
additional description of SAIC).
217 To end this particular story, in 2005 the government accused Chalabi of
leaking intelligence to Iran, which was a matter of debate, although he certainly
wanted to cozy up to Iran without detailed American knowledge. Authorities
raided his headquarters to investigate. Chalabi was nimble enough later to reinvent himself yet again, as a Shiite leader, and to occupy high posts in Iraq's
government.
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with relative accountability, from straightforward congressional
budget and procurement oversight to the strengthened checks on
contractor waste and abuse dating to the mid-to-late 1980s. 218 In
contrast, the Bush administration evaded accountability for Iraq,
never coming to terms with the implications of its enormous price
tag. By undermining congressional budgeting, such as by use of
"emergency" supplemental appropriations, the administration
shielded how the massive unnecessary "military transformation"
contracting continued even while the largely unmet need for
"boots on the ground" and other Iraq-war-related costs
mushroomed. Weakened checks on waste and abuse meant that
when the reconstruction money ran out, in late 2006, big
contractors had never completed what was needed to win support
in Iraq.
The administration relentlessly downplayed the scale of the
war's cost. A Nobel laureate economist, Professor Joseph E.
Stiglitz, coauthored a study estimating the war's costs at well over
$1 trillion and closer to $2 trillion.219 Much of the costs simply
consisted of projecting the war's operational expenses in the long
run, such as care for disabled veterans of the armed forces and of
contractors. 220 Focusing on just direct costs, the Congressional
Budget Office figured similarly to Professor Stiglitz. 221
The vivid yet ironic contrast to this unilateral Iraq war
sustained by such monumentally costly funding consisted of the
successful war against Iraq to expel it from Kuwait, a war led by
President George H. W. Bush in 1991.
The 1991 war was
conducted both militarily and financially on a multilateral basis, 222
218 A powerful contributing factor was simply the effect of divided
government in each instance. The Democratic Congress of the Gulf War would
not let that Bush administration, nor would the Republican Congress of the Bosnia
occupation let the Clinton administration, hide much of the costs.
219 Bilmes & Stiglitz, supra note 51, at 30 (concluding that the Iraq war will
cost between $1026 and $2239 billion).
220 Economists who were more sympathetic to the administration came up
with lower figures. See Payingfor Iraq: Blood and Treasure,ECONOMIST, Apr. 8, 2006,
at 33 (providing an accessible guide to the economic debate).
221 See Letter from Peter R. Orszag, Dir., Cong. Budget Office of the U.S.
Cong., to Kent Conrad, Chairman, Comm. on the Budget of the U.S. Cong., (Feb.
7, 2007), available at http:/ / www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/77xx/ doc7793/ 02-07-Costof
War.pdf (summarizing the Congressional Budget Office's findings on the costs of
the Iraq war). Another part of the $2 trillion figure consisted of the impact of
heightened oil costs and the unfavorable macroeconomic impact of the war.
222 In 1990, the senior President Bush accepted the challenge and the
discipline to conduct the war on a multilateral basis, with full Security Council
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so it did not need deficit financing. In contrast, the country must
carry the Iraq debt load from this war, by itself, through the fiscal
challenges of the 2010s. 223
4.3. "Emergency" Supplementals as a Failed UnilateralistFunding
Structure
Ordinarily, the enormous Iraq commitment shouldered
unilaterally would elicit a great deal of budgetary and legislative
scrutiny, including cutbacks on unsustainable
"military
transformation" unrelated to the war. Scrutiny would force the
administration to maintain an adequate army size and bolster the
reserves, rather than overspending on the war-unrelated, high22 4
tech, high-profit military weaponry described above.
For years, Secretary Rumsfeld fought effectively against
congressional critics who complained about inadequate ground
force size. One congressional proposal in spring 2004, would have
225
added 40,000 troops to the army, and 15,000 to the marine corps.
The administration evaded such serious budgeting accountability
through such legal abuses as the annual outside-the-budget Iraq
"emergency" supplemental bill.226
From 2004 on, the administration obtained over $50 billion a
year, largely for Iraq, through the so-called "emergency"
authorization, and tangible support from world and regional powers. Notably,
those supporting countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, picked up the tab for the
military operation itself.
223 Then, too, the oil-producing regional nations supporting the multilateral
1991 effort pledged to keep oil prices within reason, making it easier for the
American economy in the 1990s in a way that contrasted with the spike in oil
prices of the 2000s.
224 This includes nuclear attack submarines, stealth destroyers, unneeded
additional stealth fighters, "Future Combat Systems," and expenditures on
questionable crusades for antimissile and space warfare.
225 See William Matthews, $402B Doesn't Count Iraq: Pentagon, Capitol Hill at
Odds Over '05 Spending Plan, ARMED FORCES J., Mar. 2004, at 8 (discussing the
tension between Rumsfeld and Congress, where Congress wanted to significantly
increase troop numbers in order to decrease the strain on the military, and
Rumsfeld wanted to avoid end-strength increases).
226 In the 2002-2003 period, the administration obtained virtually a blank
check by funding Iraq in part through a slackly overseen national security slush
fund initially called the "Defense Emergency Response Fund" and later renamed
the "Iraqi Freedom Fund." See Paul Schmidt, The Sword and the Purse: The Why and
How of Congressional Delegation of Budget Authority to DoD, ARMED FORCES
COMPTROLLER, June 22, 2005, http://www.allbusiness.com/accounting-reporting/
cash-flow-management/576827-1.html (providing a critical summary of Candreva
& Jones, supra note 29).
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supplemental appropriation to pay war costs. That is, Congress
currently approves about $450 billion in defense expenditures
through a budget process and a pair of laws. 227 These processes
allow some tough-minded scrutiny without a contractorconvenient suppression of accountability.
However,
the Iraq
(and Afghanistan) supplemental
appropriation moves outside the regular annual budget act
process, that is, the annual budget resolution did not set a figure
for the supplemental. 228 Moreover, the administration deviously
merged the Iraq and Afghanistan expenditures as one "war on
terror," so the 9/11 attack provided cover for the Iraq war. 229 And,
the Iraq supplemental did not require prior enactment of
legislative authorization provisions, the way weapons programs
3
regularly do.2 0
The administration abused "emergency" supplementals to
combine its foot-dragging as to the inadequacy of ground and
reserve forces with its free-spending profligacy for high-profit
"military transformation" weaponry unrelated to the Iraq war. For
example, the administration gamed Congress into Secretary
227 This means that the whole House and the whole Senate debate and vote
on the numbers in a concurrent budget resolution.
Then, the specific
expenditures must receive authorization, in a defense authorization law, before
they receive appropriation, in a defense appropriation law. The overall defense
figure, and a breakdown by budget functions, gets set through the regular annual
budget act process, then parceled out in detail by the authorization-appropriation
process. This means express sanction for the specific programs must get through
the defense authorization written by the defense authorization committees and
debated and voted upon, again, by the whole House and the whole Senate.
228 See Baumann, supra note 30, at 40 (summarizing the supplemental funding
measures used to finance the Iraq war). This method of funding was criticized
even by administration-sympathetic commentators. See Tom Donnelly & Vance
Serchuk, A Bigger, Badder, Better Army: The Military Needed for the Bush Doctrine,

WKLY. STANDARD,

Nov. 29, 2004, at 16, 17 ("The additional costs associated with

reliance on reservists have been masked thus far by the budgetary games used to
pay for the war through 'emergency' supplemental appropriations. But the costs
are nonetheless real and great."). The authors are defense policy analysts at the
American Enterprise Institute.
229 Thereby, the administration kept the public in the dark even about the
specific figure for just-Iraq operational expenditures; even the Congressional
Budget Office could only say for the period 2001-2006 that of the $503 billion in
budget authority for operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan, "[alt least 70
percent of that amount has been allocated for the war in Iraq." Letter from Peter
R. Orszag to Kent Conrad, supra note 221 (summarizing the funding provided for
military and diplomatic operations in Iraq and Afghanistan through January 31,
2007).
230

Matthews, supra note 52.
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Rumsfeld's preferred form of army restructuring by funding it as
part of the Iraq supplementals although it had nothing to do with
Iraq.231 Even hawkish critics could not get a handle, 232 for the
supplemental was uniquely impervious to oversight. The bill
never had difficulty with passage no matter how little oversight
was allowed. Few had dared hold up to scrutiny or delay passage
of the "emergency" supplemental- doing so made one appear
unpatriotic and unsupportive of the troops in the field.
Accordingly, Secretary Rumsfeld managed to press ahead with
military transformation, 233 fending off the increasingly intense calls
for a truly enlarged army. 234
It was not until the FY2008
submission that the administration was finally required to include
the projected 2008 supplemental request in the annual budget. It
then became clear, as President Bush requested $481.4 billion, that
the requested budget "push[ed] U.S. defense spending to levels not
seen since the Reagan-era buildup of the 1980s."235 Meanwhile, the
spring 2007 supplemental elicited a veto from President Bush
when the newly elected Congress attempted to affect Iraq policy.
Ultimately, President Bush triumphed in May 2007 and forced

231 His $69 billion "transformation" of the army to brigade-centered forces,
rather than forces centered upon division-sized units, did not mean significantly
more troops but did mean many billions more in equipment. Sandra I. Erwin,
Efforts to Reorganize U.S. Army Tied to Emergency War Spending, NAT'L DEFENSE,
Mar. 2005. For example, a force centered on division-size units has artillery at the
division level. A force centered on brigade-size units has autonomous artillery to
go with each brigade.
232 Critics of the administration's priorities included strong Iraq war
supporters like Sen. John McCain. Such critics expressed outrage at Secretary
Rumsfeld using "emergency" war appropriations "to hide the costs of personnel,
weapons and vehicles that typically would be included in the Defense
Department's yearly budget proposal." Id.
233 He stuck by plans to spend the lion's share of funding only on the
contractors' profitable long-range, precision-strike weaponry of little use in Iraq.
234 These calls came from retired generals, congressional defense hawks, and
others with credentials of support and experience in military affairs as good or
better than Secretary Rumsfeld's own. As early as late 2003, a conservative critic,
Tom Donnelly, grumbled that "[t]he secretary's mulish opposition to increasing
the number of American soldiers in Iraq and the narrow understanding of
military 'transformation' used to justify that stance" would lead the
administration to "go begging" for "Turkish, Indian, or Pakistani troops." Tom
Donnelly, Secretary of Stubbornness:Donald Rumsfeld's Idge Fixe Endangers Success in
Iraq, WKLY. STANDARD, Sept. 15, 2003, at 16.
235 Ann Scott Tyson, Bush's Defense Budget Biggest Since Reagan Era, WASH.
POST, Feb. 6, 2007, at Al.
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Congress to send him a supplemental stripped of troop
236
deadlines.
In 2003-2006, the war's spending and directing proceeded with
little or no oversight by a Congress of the same party as the
administration. 237 As journalist Thomas Ricks wrote, the brief
flurry of Abu Ghraib hearings produced "little follow-up
investigation or oversight . . . . In retrospect, the hearings
[following the Abu Ghraib revelations] of May and June 2004 were
a spasm before the election season. They made it appear that
Congress was paying attention, but they did little to ... produce
more information." 238
The administration escaped serious
congressional oversight by such means as stonewalling the most
vigorous efforts, led by the senior minority member on the House's
239
chief oversight committee, Rep. Henry Waxman.
Evasion of accountability means the absence of reform. As
Gen. Barry R. McCaffrey wrote in 2005, "[tlhere is an impression
among our nation's warriors that the armed forces are at war, but
the country isn't.
Resources, people and equipment are
inadequate... [but Secretary] Rumsfeld refuses to expand the
active force, stating that we have no troop shortage." 240 An
236 Carl Hulse, Democrats Pull Troop Deadlinefrom Iraq Bill, N.Y. TIMES, May 23,
2007, at Al.
237 "The Republican Congress has specialized in Potemkin hearings.... Since
1997, the House Government Reform committee has issued over 1000 subpoenas
related to allegations of misconduct involving the Clinton administration or the
Democratic party- compared to just 15 related to Bush administration or
Republican abuses." Zachary Roth, Investi-gate: Mhat's Really at Stake in the
November Elections, WASH. MONTHLY, June 2006, at 31, 32-33.
238 RIcKS, supra note 1, at 387.
Although the Senate had figures such as
Senator McCain, who insisted scrutiny, the House Armed Services Committee
boasted that it did not hold hearings even over Abu Ghraib.
239 While his staff's report on Iraq contracting, DOLLARS, NOT SENSE, supra
note 4, is a treasure trove of revelations about Iraq contracting, it is also replete
with instances in which the Department of Defense fended off accountability. The
exception that proved the rule was the flow of hearings and reports on Iraq
problems in general, and Iraq procurement problems in particular, from the only
body in the Congress where Democrats could hold hearings before 2007, the
Senate Democratic Policy Committee. For an example, see An Oversight Hearing
on Waste, Fraud,and Abuse in U.S. Government Contractingin Iraq: Hearing Before the
S. Democratic Policy Comm., 109th Cong. (2005), available at http://democrats
.senate.gov/dpc/dpc-hearing.cfm?A=22. However, the policy committee lacked
power, in holding hearings, either to subpoena documents or witnesses, or to act
on nominations or legislation, so it could not force information out of a
recalcitrant administration.
240 Gen. Barry R. McCaffrey, Iraq: A Precarious Balance, ARMED FORCES J., Feb.
2005, at 40, 43.
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example is the rosy reporting about training that buried the
contractors' failures to make the picture cheerier before the 2004
241
election.
One oversight mechanism, however, did work-the Special
Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. 242 But his writ did not
extend generally to military services contracting and other big
policy issues, such as President Bush's unilateral restrictions on
bidders. Moreover, as late as 2006-2007, Halliburton refused to
disclose basic information even to the Inspector General, claiming
243
the data were proprietary.
Finally, in 2007, the newly elected Congress resumed efforts
towards vigorous oversight over matters including contracting
failures. The armed services committees now conducted sharp
probes into whether contractors served the needs of the troops in
Iraq, both uncovering body armor failures and reorienting
spending from missile defense and other irrelevancies to vitally
needed armored vehicles. 244 Foreign affairs committees dragged
out of a reluctant administration the admission that of the aid
commitments made by donors at the October 2004 Madrid
conference, "the European Union, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the

Its reporting grossly exaggerated the training level of Iraqi army and
security forces, at a time when, as discussed, internally, senior army officials were
castigating the training contractors for their failure. See ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN,
241

CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT'L STUDIES, INEXCUSABLE FAILURE: PROGRESS IN TRAINING

2004 (2004), available at
http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/iraq-inexcusablefailure.pdf.
242 This was a post created with the December 2003 $18.4 billion IRRF
appropriation and held by Stuart Bowen. The Special Inspector General's reports
served to hint at what full oversight in Iraq would have revealed. For example, he
concluded that the administration could not account for nearly $9 billion shipped
from the DFI (the oil revenue fund, ostensibly Iraq's own money under United
Nations supervision but actually controlled by the CPA) to Iraq's ministries. See
MILLER, supra note 3, at 197 (noting Bowen's conclusion that the United States had
violated its "duty to hold the Iraqis' money in trust").
243 James Glanz & Floyd Norris, Report Says Iraq ContractorIs Hiding Datafrom
U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2006, at A8 (reporting that a Halliburton subsidiary is
alleged to have withheld information on its practices from U.S. officials).
244 See e.g., Megan Scully, Air Force Officials Seek Debarment of Body Armor
Maker, CONGRESSDAILY, June 11, 2007, http://nationaljournal.com/pubs/
congressdaily/ (discussing the recommendation for the air force to prohibit a
certain company from signing new contracts with the United States government);
Megan Scully, Army Challenged on Adequacy of Vehicle Protection in Iraq,
CONGRESSDAILY, Mar. 14, 2007, http://nationaljournal.com/ pubs/congressdaily/
(noting the debate over the inadequacies of the safety of tactical vehicles against
roadside bombs).
THE IRAQI ARMY AND SECURITY FORCES AS OF MID-JULY
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United Arab Emirates [were] providing less than 10 percent of aid
promised." 245 Congress elicited GAO criticism of contractors on
matters from military supply chain logistics to oil industry
246
ieconstruction.
Late as this was, though, the administration still fought back
against accountability. For example, at a number of congressional
briefings for the House armed services' oversight subcommittee in
2007 about failures in training Iraqi forces (covering issues
previously discussed above), the administration blocked either
high-level military officers from testifying from Iraq via video, or
middle-level military officers from giving recorded evidence in
person. 247 Congress was not to know.
5.

CONCLUSION

5.1. Beyond Just "Let's Not Do Iraq Again"
As to the future, some may satisfy themselves that just trying to
avoid another intervention like the Iraq invasion answers
completely the problems revealed by the war's toll. This Article
has deliberately skipped the separate topic of the original decision
to invade.
Regardless of whether this was an occasion to
intervene, there will be occasions in the future in which the United
States should and will intervene. It requires only a look back at the
last decade, at instances like Rwanda, to see the dangers of reacting
248
against one problematic intervention by refusing the next one.
245 Andy Leonatti, Lantos, Bowen Spar Over Progress of Iraq Reconstruction,
CONGRESSDAILY, May 23, 2007, http://nationaljournal.com/pubs/congressdaily/.
246 See Iraq Oil Sector Feeble, GAO Finds, WASH. PosT, Aug. 3, 2007, at A13
(citing an excerpt from the Government Accountability Office's oil industry report
describing the shortcomings of the Iraqis); Otto Kreisher, GAO Criticizes DOD
Combat Supply Operations Strategy, CONGRFSSDAILY,
July 11,
2007,
http://nationaljournal.com/pubs/congressdaily/.
247 See Megan Scully, Meehan Calls DOD Uncooperative in Probe of Iraq Forces,
CONGRESSDAILY, May 22, 2007, http://nationaljournal.com/pubs/congressdaily/
(reporting how Democratic representative Martin Meehan criticized the
Department of Defense "for failing to cooperate with his investigation into efforts
to train and organize Iraqi security forces"); Megan Scully, Pentagon Issues Gag
Order to Prevent U.S. Military Trainers from Testifying, CONGRESSDAILY, Apr. 20,
(reporting that the
2007, http://nationaljournal.com/pubs/congressdaily/
Pentagon prevented military officers from sharing their personal experiences
working with Iraqi security forces at a House subcommittee briefing).
248 The U.S. public reacted against what happened in the 1992-93
intervention in Somalia, which was epitomized by killings and mistreatment of
U.S. soldiers in Mogadishu. The reaction against this intervention meant that
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Sometimes the United States must go in where it must again face
the problems of how to avoid an occupation going as badly as Iraq.
5.2. Legislative Reform
First, the nation must counter-balance the excessive influence
of the defense contracting industry, particularly the high-tech,
high-profit systems that divert-to unilateral wars against regular
forces-the resources needed for multilateral peacekeeping in the
face of irregular forces. Stronger revolving door rules should limit
the industry's tendency to take over the top ranks of the national
security establishment. Also, the nation needs rules to limit
contributions out of contractors' PACs and from its top-earning
249
executives and stockholders.
Each aspect of the paradigm discussed in this Article that traces
back, in whole or in part, to a common root of contractor industry
indulgence deserves scrutiny for its natural counterbalance or
antidote.
Starting with military transformation, the political
process must constrain the military contractor industry from
drawing too much of the military budget off to high-profit
hardware and services, and leaving such small portions for troops.
The army and its reserves need a countervailing voice on behalf of
troop levels. With the greater importance of the reserves in
contemporary deployments, the reserves in particular need a
political voice. Reserve and retired officers need a clear mandate
to speak, especially to speak in criticism of an overstraining
administration. The congressional armed services committees
should elevate and give special status to personnel subcommittees
that would stand up for the significance of manpower reserves visA-vis those interested in procurement.
As to unilateralism, much has already been written about the
missteps in the Iraq invasion that mobilized and hardened world
sentiment against the United States. Focusing just on the concrete
procurement-related aspects of unilateralism, the United States
might actively engage, with potential logistical support and
reconstruction businesses in the regions such as the Middle East in
thereafter the United States sharply pulled back from taking part in further U.N.
peacekeeping. As a result, the United States allowed the terrible genocide in
Rwanda to occur.
249 Most especially, such contributions must stop going to members of the
congressional committees of jurisdiction, the armed services and appropriation
committees.
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particular, where conflict is most likely. The United States could
pre-qualify such businesses in potentially supportive countries
such as Turkey, Pakistan, India, Egypt, and Jordan with the same
attention it gives to pre-positioning equipment.
Indeed, as much as possible, it might bring such foreign
businesses more into the LOGCAP system for its overseas forces so
that they are already pre-qualified and pre-competed when the
need arises. A similar or lesser-scale network in Africa would both
facilitate and demonstrate American willingness to assist
humanitarian interventions. This would openly draw contractual
needs in case of occupations from these other countries. The
United States could not engage readily in wars that alienate all
international support, 250 but when engaged in a war and
occupation with at least some international support, it would gain
the helpful productive capacity of allies contractually on board in
that effort. Such support would in effect permit the United States
to attain a more promising multilateral approach.
The problems of the Iraq war have brought forth a number of
sound practical proposals, not relating to high-profit "military
transformation" hardware, for preparing for future similar
deployments. Several address the nature of military contingencies,
looking for new legal arrangements to help handle them. One is to
have a logistics reserve corps 251 and a contingency-contracting
article in the Federal Acquisition Regulation. 252 Faced with a
contingency, the military would not just stretch the regular
contracting officers and rules further, and largely turn matters over
to contractors. Instead, it would bring back trained personnel in
the reserves to work with and to supervise contractors, and to
apply special and well-adapted rules for those contractors. This

250 This would work much like the military's dependence upon its reserves,
the so-called "Abrams Doctrine" (which stated that, after Vietnam, the army
should depend upon reserves, which would mean it could only get deeply
committed with the awareness of the public that has personal ties to the called-up
reservists).
251 The navy not only has a logistics reserve corps, it has used it in Iraq. Greg
Johnson, Inaugural Deployment of NAVELSF Contingency Contracting, NAV. SUP.
CORPS NEWSLETTER, July 1, 2005, at 4.
252 See Jeffery Alan Green, Alternatives for the Future of Contingency
Contracting:Avoiding a Repeat of the Mistakes of Iraq, 35 PUB.CONT. L.J. 447, 449-54
(2006) (discussing various possible methods of reformation to improve the
Department of Defense's current contingency-contracting program).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

U. Pa. 1. Int'I L.

[Vol. 29:1

would relate both to the combat support and to the reconstruction
sides. The services are already moving ahead on this. 253
Looking at the nature of reconstruction contracting, the Special
Inspector General drew this sound lesson for the future:
Avoid using expensive design-build contracts to execute
small scale projects. While the use of large construction
consortia may be appropriate for very extensive projects,
most projects in Iraq were smaller and could have been
4
executed through fixed-price direct contracting. 25
Moreover, the United States needs to change direction from the
radical version of acquisition reform that brought the contractors
participating at Abu Ghraib, the failure of MPRI and Vinnell to
train the new Iraqi army, and the scandals of Halliburton. The
treatment for that is well recognized and includes the following:
restoring the levels and strength of the federal acquisition
workforce; 255 bringing back full and open competition and
contracting officer supervision; reining in use, for nonroutine
purchases, of poorly overseen contracts like interagency vehicles;
and creating some transparency so that it becomes hard for
political officials to take contractors' sides against auditors, as with
Halliburton.
Logistical contracts need treatment as highly
important parts of defense policy. 25 6
The military will be revising their counterinsurgency strategy
to learn the lessons of Iraq much as they revised it to learn the
lessons of Vietnam. Much of that revision is an issue beyond this
Article. However, a logistics approach must develop that can deal

253 See, e.g., Wilson "Chip" Summers, Maj. Gen. Darryl A. Scott, USAF DCA4A'
Director Sits Down with Defense AT&L, DEF. AT&L, Jan.-Feb. 2005, at 2, 4-7, 9
(providing the DCMA Director's description of existing contingency contracting
reserves); Scott Svabek, Pre-LiberationIraqi Procurement Processes, Part 1 of 2, CoNT.
MGMT., July 2005, at 44, 46-48 (describing Svabek's personal experiences in
developing contract arrangements for distribution of medical supplies in Iraq).
254 Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons Learned in Contractingand Procurement: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. On Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs, 109th Cong. 45
(2006) (statement of Stuart W. Bowen, Jr., Spec. Inspector Gen. for Iraq
Reconstruction).
255 E.g., Econom, supra note 14, at 174, 181-87 (describing ways in which the
federal acquisition workforce may be bolstered).
256 They need splitting into pieces, and/or formal requirements as to
subcontract planning, to allow more competition, more inclusion of small and
foreign businesses, and some degree of fixed unit pricing rather than all aspects
being cost-reimbursement.
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better with the supporting of a counterinsurgency effort than
dependence upon LOGCAP and Blackwater-type private security.
The answer may lie in a logistics reserve that can share logistics
and security efforts with private companies. Just as the reserve
would hold regular exercises, the companies could well participate
in these exercises as a form of contracted-for readiness.
Furthermore, the system of oversight of procurement and
related expenditure, from congressional hearings to internal audits,
has been so blocked and damaged during the Iraq occupation as to
require a major effort at restoration. There needs to be a backlash
against the overuse of doctrines related to executive privilege by
which the failings of the Iraq effort, particularly those of its
contractors, were swept under the rug from 2003 on. Military
appropriations require a strengthened, disciplined place in the
budget system so that "emergency" supplementals cannot serve as
slush funds for unscrutinized, undisciplined policies. The country
can only have the civilian "contractors on the battlefield" like
Halliburton on the current scale with "auditors on the battlefield"
257
to keep them honest.
It is very hard for the United States to look at the awful waste in blood and treasure-of the Iraq occupation's failures. But by
studying the missteps, it can understand the paradigm that rose
and fell in Iraq, and can do better. The nation learned from the
Vietnam War to develop a variety of reforms. 258 Those Vietnam
War lessons served the nation fairly well for thirty years, notably
in the Gulf War. Learning the right lessons from the Iraq
occupation would be the best hope for a similarly long interval of
less disastrous interventions ahead.

257 That is, both the Department of Defense Inspector General and the
Government Accounting Office should have high-visibility arms expected to
follow the military during wars and occupations.
258 These ranged from a larger role for Congress in making considered
decisions on commitments and wars, to the "Powell Doctrine" of going in only
when ready to use overwhelming military force, based upon reserves.
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